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ARTHUR M. WOOD

Mr. Walter E. Hanson, Chairman
Executive Committee
SEC Practice Section
Division for CPA Firms
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Hanson:
I am pleased to submit herewith the report of the Public
Oversight Board on "Scope of Services by CPA Firms". This
report is submitted in response to your request, on behalf of
the Executive Committee, that the Board consider and express
its views with respect to the proposed amendment to Section
IV, 3(i), of the Organizational Structure and Functions of
the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms.
This report was made available, in tentative form, to
the Executive Committee and to the Chairman and the Chief
Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission on
February 6, 1979. We neither solicited nor received the
approval or endorsement of either the Executive Committee
or the SEC. While the report reflects in some respects
comments received from those sources, it represents solely
the views of the Board.
As indicated in the report under the caption "Conclusions
and Recommendations", the Board has not viewed favorably the
effort of the Executive Committee to engage in a series of
determinations on hypothetical situations with respect to
which management advisory service (MAS) engagements do, and
which do not, involve skills related to accounting or auditing.
The Board believes that this approach would involve the
Executive Committee in an array of ad hoc judgements which
would become, or appear to be, increasingly arbitrary, and
that it lends itself to logical extensions beyond the policy
purpose sought to be achieved. We believe that it is wiser
for the Executive Committee to adhere to the concept of
independence and the appearance thereof as sole the governing
principle.
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The Board has also considered and rejected the more
extreme view, expressed in the report of the Senate Sub
committee on Reports, Accounting and Management, that
auditors be prohibited from furnishing to audit clients any
nonaudit services other than tax services and "certain
computer and system analyses...necessary for improving
internal control procedures of corporations".
Such a
draconian measure would not only deprive audit clients of
services that they obviously deem valuable but also would
cause a substantial reduction in revenues for many CPA firms,
especially the smaller ones. We do not believe that otherwise
lawful and productive economic activity should be prohibited
unless such prohibition is clearly in the public interest
and no other measures are available.
These conclusions should not be interpreted to mean
that the Board views the matter of scope of services with
complacency or believes that possible dangers can be avoided
solely with general exhortations to the members to preserve
independence. The mere fact that so many persons have
expressed concern with the subject, both in and out of the
government, over an extended period is reason to conclude
that it cannot be dismissed as a chimera.
The Board believes
that there is possibility of damage to the profession and
the users of the profession's services in an uncontrolled
expansion of MAS to audit clients.
Investors and others
need a public accounting profession that performs its primary
function of auditing financial statements with both the fact
and the appearance of competence and independence. Develop
ments which detract from this will surely damage the profes
sional status of CPA firms and lead to suspicions and doubts
that will be detrimental to the continued reliance of the
public upon the profession without further and more drastic
governmental intrusion. Effective measures must be taken to
guard against such a development. Fortunately, in the Board's
view, they are at hand.
The new proxy statement disclosures occasioned by ASR
250 will largely remove the mystery surrounding the type and
magnitude of actual services performed for reporting companies
by auditing firms and will have a restraining influence to
the degree that some services may be generally perceived as
being incompatible with professional stature. The inclusion
in peer reviews of an examination of MAS as they may bear on
the reviewed firm's independence, including a review of the
role performed by the reviewed firm in MAS engagement, will
give further assurance of the maintenance of independence.
Finally, the new encouragement for audit committees and boards
of directors to be aware of the existence of MAS, to approve

Mr. Walter E, Hanson

- 3 -

March 9, 1979

them, and in so doing to consider the matter of independence,
will have a salutary effect. While these new developments
may not change existing arrangements, which, of course, they
need not, they should do much to allay suspicions.
The Board has considered whether it should attempt to
suggest more specific guidance regarding what factors should
be considered by audit committees and boards of directors
in reaching judgments on the possible effect of a proposed
MAS engagement on independence. In view of the manifold
complexity of the total relationship between an accounting
firm and an audit client and the infinite variations found
in actual practice, the Board has decided that such an effort
would be more misleading than helpful. Rather we believe
that audit committees and boards of directors should consider
all of the factors mentioned in the report as they may apply
to a particular circumstance. To this end, member firms may
find it useful to make copies of this report available to
their clients.
We hope these views commend themselves to your favorable
consideration.
Very truly yours,

J ohn J. McCloy
Chairman
JJM/kae
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Introduction
In July 1978, the Public Oversight Board (Board) of the SEC Practice
Section of the AICPA’s Division for CPA Firms published Notice
of Public Hearing 78-1 (Notice) soliciting public comment and
announcing oral hearings concerning the general subject of scope
of services for member firms of the SEC Practice Section. Concep
tually, the term “scope of services” could refer to any type of service
performed by accounting firms,1 including accounting, auditing, tax,
and a wide variety of so-called management advisory services, or
“MAS.” When speaking of MAS in this report the Board is referring
to any service other than accounting, auditing, or tax services fur
nished by independent certified public accountants and firms with
which they are associated. It includes such things as executive
recruitment, actuarial services, profit planning and budget consulting,
marketing analysis, financial planning and control services, data
processing services, inventory control systems, plant layout, account
ing systems design, and employee benefit plan consulting.
The Notice requested that the written comments and the oral
testimony address a number of broad questions as well as a specific
proposal of the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section
(Proposal) to limit the scope of services a member firm may furnish
to its audit clients who file audited financial statements with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as the “Commission” or the “SEC”).
The oral hearings were held on August 17-18, 1978; 31 witnesses
delivered statements and were questioned by members of the Board
and its staff. A transcript of those hearings was maintained.2 In
addition, the Board received written statements from 152 commenta
tors,3 and, as indicated in the Notice, the Board incorporated into its
1. In this report, the terms “accounting firms,” “CPA firms,” “public account
ing firms,” “certified public accounting firms,” and “auditing firms” are used
interchangeably. Similarly, the terms “accountant,” “CPA,” and “auditor”
are used interchangeably.
2. References to that transcript will be cited herein as “POB Hearing
Testimony.”
3. Comments were received from 89 accounting firms and individual public
accountants, 12 consulting firms (including actuarial, data processing, and
personnel consultants), 13 members of academia, 33 client companies, and 5
miscellaneous commentators.

1

record the approximately 400 written comments received by the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to its request for com
ments in Securities Act Release No. 5869 (September 26, 1977).
Finally, numerous published articles, studies, and surveys relating to
scope of services have served as background material for the Board
and have, in part, been relied upon in formulating its conclusions.4
This report contains a general discussion of the background giving

4. Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, Committee on
Government Affairs, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Improving
the Accountability of Publicly Owned Corporations and Their Auditors (Com
mittee Print 1977) (“Senate Report”); Staff of the Subcommittee on Reports,
Accounting and Management, Committee on Government Affairs, United
State Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., The Accounting Establishment: A Staff
Study (1977) (“Senate Staff Report”); Securities and Exchange Commission,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and
the Commission’s Oversight Role (Committee Print 1978) (“SEC Report to
Congress”); The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities; Report, Con
clusions, and Recommendations (New York 1978) (“Cohen Commission
Report”); Committee on Scope and Structure, Final Report (AICPA 1974)
(“1974 Final Report”); AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence, “Final
Report,” Journal of Accountancy (December 1969) (“1969 Final Report”);
An Opinion Survey of the Public Accounting Profession, sponsored by Deloitte
Haskins & Sells and conducted by Reichman Research, Inc. (New York 1978);
J. Rhode, “The Independent Auditor’s Work Environment: A Survey” (AICPA
1978); The Balance Sheet: Top Executives Speak Out About CPA Firms, Wall
Street Journal (Dow Jones & Company, Inc. 1978).
For individual commentators, see, e.g., W. Dreher and C. Graese, “The
Compatibility of Actuarial Consulting and Auditing Services,” Journal of
Accountancy (July 1978); T. Kelley and D. Roscetti, “Auditor/Actuary Re
lations Under ERISA: From the Auditor’s Standpoint,” Journal of Account
ancy (July 1978); B. Hazlehurst, “Auditor/Actuary Relations Under ERISA:
As an Actuary Sees It,” Journal of Accountancy (July 1978); S. Klion, “MAS
Practice: Are The Critics Justified?,” Journal of Accountancy (June 1978);
D. Miller, “The Annual Audit Revisited,” Financial Executive (March 1978);
D. Lavin, “Perceptions of the Independence of the Auditor,” Accounting
Review (January 1976); R. Hartley and T. Ross, “MAS and Audit Independ
ence: An Image Problem,” Journal of Accountancy (November 1972); G.
Hobgood and J. Sciarrino, “Management Looks at Audit Services (Part II),”
Financial Executive (August 1972); G. Hobgood and J. Sciarrino “Manage
ment Looks at Audit Services,” Financial Executive (April 1972); P. Titard,
“Independence and MAS— Opinions of Financial Statement Users,” Journal
of Accountancy (July 1971); A. Briloff, “Old Myths and New Realities in
Accountancy,” Accounting Review (July 1966); J. Carey and W. Doherty,
“The Concept of Independence— Review and Restatement,” Journal of Ac
countancy (January 1966); A. Schulte, “Compatibility of Management Consult
ing and Auditing,” Accounting Review (July 1965).
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rise to the scope of services question, the existing and proposed re
strictions on scope of services imposed and to be imposed by the SEC
Practice Section, and the Board’s analyses and conclusions with
respect to those restrictions and proposed restrictions as well as the
question of limiting scope of services generally.5

5. This report is concerned with the performance of MAS by member firms
of the SEC Practice Section for clients for whom they serve as independent
public accountants rendering opinions on financial reports. For convenience,
such clients are referred to as “audit clients.”

3

Conclusions and Recommendations
Preamble

The conclusions and recommendations contained in this section of
the report reflect the Board’s views with respect to the specific scope
of service limitations which are presently a condition of membership
in the SEC Practice Section and those scope of service limitations
which are embodied in the Proposal. While the Board’s general con
clusions and recommendations might be viewed in some respects as
more permissive than the existing and proposed scope of service
limitations, this should not suggest that the Board perceives no prob
lems associated with accounting firms furnishing all forms of MAS
to audit clients. The most fundamental departure by the Board
from the existing and proposed scope of service limitations appears
in the Board’s treatment of those forms of MAS which do not impair
auditor independence but which involve services not in accounting
or financial related areas or which do not require skills related to
accounting or auditing—that is, services which may impair the pro
fessional image of an accountant but not his independence.
As discussed more fully in the body of this report, the Board is
concerned with professional image but does not believe that rulemaking is the appropriate way to address the problem. Rather, the
Board believes it is preferable to rely on public disclosure, supple
mented by the admonition to members of the SEC Practice Section
to exercise self-restraint and judgment before venturing into new
areas of MAS.
With this in mind, the Board has drawn the following conclusions
and makes the following recommendations:
1. There are many potential benefits to be realized by permitting
auditors to perform MAS for audit clients that should not be denied
to such clients without a strong showing of actual or potential detri
ment. The profession, therefore, should be careful not to impose
unnecessarily broad prophylactic rules with respect to MAS and
independence.
2. The Board generally concludes that mandatory limitations on
scope of services should be predicated only on the determination
that certain services, or the role of the firm performing certain ser
vices, will impair a member’s independence in rendering an opinion
on the fairness of a client’s financial statements or present a strong
4

likelihood of doing so. Independence is generally defined as the
ability to operate with integrity and objectivity. Integrity is an ele
ment of character, and objectivity relates to the ability of an auditor
to maintain impartiality of attitude and avoid conflicts of interest. All
conflicts of interest are not avoidable and some conflicts of interest
produce countervailing benefits. Such conflicts are accepted, con
sistent with the concept of independence, because of practical necessity
and the realization of important benefits, coupled with the fact that
auditor integrity and various legal incentives provide adequate public
protection. This helps explain public acceptance of the fact that
auditors can be “independent” even though the client selects them
and pays their fee. It also helps explain why there has been public
acceptance of accounting firms furnishing a variety of tax advisory
services to audit clients. Recognizing, therefore, that independence
in an absolute sense cannot be achieved, when evaluating whether
certain services should be prohibited, it is necessary to consider the
potential benefits derived from the service and balance them against
the possible or apparent impairment to the auditor’s objectivity.
3. At this time no rules should be imposed to prohibit specific
services on the grounds that they are or may be incompatible with
the profession of public accounting, might impair the image of the
profession, or do not involve accounting or auditing related skills.
4. The existing limitations on MAS concerning independence con
tained in the Professional Standards relating to Management Advisory
Services (“MAS Professional Standards”), AICPA, Professional Stan
dards, Vol. 1, MS §§ 101 et seq. and the Code of Professional Ethics,
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET §§ 50 et seq.6 embrace
several provisions that are helpful in ensuring that independence will
be maintained. Compliance with those applicable provisions should
be made a condition of membership in the SEC Practice Section and
peer reviews should be required to test for compliance.
5. Amendments to Regulation 14A (the proxy rules) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and certain publicly available
reports required of members of the SEC Practice Section will increase
the amount of public disclosure concerning the nature and amount
of MAS furnished by an auditor to an audit client and will reveal
whether the client’s audit committee or board of directors have both
approved the MAS and considered its possible effect on independence.
To the extent that certain MAS may be perceived publicly as impair
ing independence, the new disclosure rules, including the role of the
audit committee or the board of directors, should either allay suspicion
6.

See notes 145 and 159, infra, and accompanying text.
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or cause clients and auditors to alter their relationships. These dis
closure provisions should be given a chance to work, and they should
serve to provide a stronger data base for monitoring of this area.
The Board does, however, recommend that SEC Practice Section
members be required to include in their annual disclosure statements
filed with the SEC Practice Section disclosure of gross fees both for
MAS and tax services performed for audit clients expressed as a per
centage of aggregate fees charged during the reporting period.
6. In the Board’s view an accounting firm’s independence is not
impaired solely because a person associated with the firm acts as an
enrolled actuary for an employee benefit plan of an audit client or as
an enrolled actuary for such a plan which is an audit client. The
Board, however, believes that an accounting firm should not provide
actuarial services for an insurance company audit client unless those
services are supplemental to primary actuarial advice furnished by
another actuary not associated with the accounting firm.
7. The Board accepts the recent action of the Executive Committee
proscribing certain executive recruiting services inasmuch as the ser
vices proscribed are perceived by others as having a strong likelihood
of impairing independence, are available from other responsible
sources, and do not otherwise produce sufficient countervailing bene
fits. In general, however, the Board is reluctant to support prohibi
tions against useful services which are based primarily on appearance
without an adequate basis in fact.

6

Background
One of the early public criticisms concerning the breadth of services
furnished by public accountants was expressed in a survey and at
tendant article published by Arthur A. Schulte, Jr. in 1965.7 Mr.
Schulte’s study concluded that the profession should seriously con
sider whether engaging in management consulting services for audit
clients creates a conflict of interest and a concomitant lowering of
public confidence in auditors’ reports.
In the few years immediately following Mr. Schulte’s article,
several other interested persons conducted surveys and wrote articles
addressing the question of whether auditors can appropriately per
form MAS for their audit clients.8
In the fall of 1966, the AICPA formed an ad hoc committee to
examine the question of scope of services and how those services
bear on an auditor’s independence. In August 1968, an interim
report of this ad hoc committee was exposed for public comment.
This was followed by a Final Report published in December 1969.9
The 1969 Final Report concluded generally that there was no
evidence that performing a wide variety of management advisory ser
vices impairs independence in fact. The 1969 Final Report, however,
did acknowledge that a significant minority is concerned that render
ing management advisory services may impair independence, suggest
ing that the profession should be sensitive to the possibility that the
rendering of such services may affect the appearance of independ
ence.10 Nevertheless, the 1969 Final Report did not recommend
7. A. Schulte, “Compatibility of Management Consulting and Auditing,”
supra note 4. Mr. Schulte’s study was prompted by the publication by the
AICPA’s Committee on Professional Ethics of Opinion No. 12, in which the
Committee stated that “there is no ethical reason why a member or associate
may not properly perform . . . management advisory services, and at the
same time serve the same client as independent auditor.” AICPA, Committee
on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 12, “Independence” (1963). In 1973 the
AICPA codified all prior statements and opinions in the AICPA’s Code of
Professional Ethics. The original Opinion No. 12 can be found, however, in
Carey and Doherty, “The Concept of Independence— Review and Restate
ment,” supra note 4, at 39-40.
8. E.g., A. Briloff, “Old Myths and New Realities in Accountancy,” supra
note 4; J. Carey and W. Doherty, “The Concept of Independence— Review
and Restatement,” supra note 4.
9. 1969 Final Report, supra note 4.
10. The AICPA’s Committee on Professional Ethics is reported to have stated
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proscribing the rendering of MAS.11 Rather, it concluded that the
situations in which the appearance of lack of independence might be
involved are countless and that each case should be considered on its
own circumstances. Furthermore, the Committee on Management
Services of the AICPA had then recently published three statements
which attempted to guide the profession in its performance of MAS
and better inform the public of the nature of such services.12 In turn,
it was believed that the more informed the public was, the less likely
it would be that it would perceive the rendering of such services as
impairing independence.13
In 1974 the AICPA, through its Committee on Scope and Struc
ture, published another study and analysis of the question of the
appropriate scope of services for CPAs to perform.14 This study
generally concluded that the benefits to society, the audit, and the
client arising from public accountants furnishing MAS are signi
ficant and that the threat that rendering such services may impair
independence or the appearance of independence is not sufficiently
great to warrant their proscription.
Another major review of this question was conducted by the Cohen
Commission.1
5 Its examination of the scope of services question enthat the appearance of the lack of independence might arise from relationships
which “might be regarded by a reasonable observer, who had knowledge of
all the facts, as those involving conflict of interest which might impair the
objectivity of a member in expressing an opinion on the financial statements
of an enterprise.” 1969 Final Report, supra note 4, at 53.
11. The 1969 Final Report did recommend that the profession give serious
consideration to whether CPA firms should furnish so-called “peripheral man
agement advisory services” such as plant layout, executive search, and psycho
logical testing. While these services were not thought to affect independence,
they were viewed by some as diluting the image of the profession. 1969 Final
Report, supra note 4, at 55.
12. The three statements were “Tentative Description of the Nature of
Management Advisory Services by Independent Accounting Firms,” AICPA,
Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 410; “Competence in Management Ad
visory Services,” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 420; and “Role
in Management Advisory Services,” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1,
MS § 430.
13. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 96; P. Titard, “Independence
and MAS— Opinions of Financial Statements Users,” supra note 4. Accounting
Series Release No. 250 (June 29, 1978) ( “ASR 250”) discussed at pp. 42-44,
infra, is a substantial step toward this end.
14. 1974 Final Report, supra note 4.
15. The Cohen Commission was formally titled The Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities. It was an independent commission formed by the AICPA
in 1974 and chaired by the late Manuel F. Cohen. The Cohen Commission
studied several aspects of the accounting profession and in 1978 published the
Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4.
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compassed a review of the several articles and surveys which had been
published, a study of lawsuits and other proceedings against auditors,
and extensive discussions with working auditors, financial analysts,
technical partners in accounting firms, and representatives in govern
ment agencies.16 After this thorough review of available data, the
Cohen Commission was not prepared to recommend proscribing
specific services,1
7 but it did register concern that rendering MAS con
tinued to appear to impair independence, at least to a significant
minority of financial statement users.18 It suggested, therefore, that
the profession increase its educational efforts directed toward users,
with emphasis on internal controls utilized by accounting firms to
prevent conflicts of interest. Moreover, it recommended that efforts
be made to inform users of the nature of MAS rendered to clients and
that audit clients be urged to disclose the nature of the various ser
vices furnished by the auditors.19
While the AICPA, in its 1969 Final Report and in its 1974 Final
Report, and the Cohen Commission acknowledged concern that
various surveys have concluded that rendering MAS to audit clients
seemed to impair independence, at least in appearance, both con
cluded that broad proscriptions were not necessary.
Shortly after the formation of the Cohen Commission, the United
States Senate, through its Committee on Governmental Affairs, Sub
committee on Reports, Accounting and Management (“Metcalf Sub
committee”), launched a broad-scale inquiry of the accounting pro
fession which included a review of the nature of services furnished by
accounting firms. The resulting Senate Staff Report, based on inform
ation obtained from the AICPA and accounting firms, generally
concluded that auditors created a conflict of interest if they furnished
MAS to audit clients since furnishing MAS “necessarily involves the
. . . firms in the business operations of their corporate clients.”20 For
16. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 93-94.
17. The Cohen Commission did recommend that accounting firms not engage
in recruiting individuals who would be directly involved in questions of auditor
selection, with the exception that accountants ought to be permitted to respond
informally to requests to identify potential board members. The Cohen Com
mission, however, did not recommend any restrictions on the ability of in
dividual staff or partners of an accounting firm to seek employment with
clients of their firm or from clients to hire personnel from their accounting
firm for employment at any level. Ibid., at 101.
18. “Users” generally refers to investors, lenders, financial analysts, invest
ment advisers, and others who rely on financial statements for making invest
ment or credit decisions.
19. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 102-103.
20. Senate Staff Report, supra note 4, at 50. The Senate Staff Report actually
focused its attention on the so-called “Big Eight” firms and concluded that a
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example, the Senate Staff Report concluded that an auditor, furnish
ing market study services, which an audit client uses in deciding to
market a new product, has a professional interest in the success of
that product. Similarly, the report noted that an accounting firm
has a professional interest in seeing an executive, whom it recruited
or helped to recruit, perform well in his new position. Accordingly,
the argument goes, the auditor is no longer independent, now having
an interest in seeing all or a segment of the client’s business succeed.
In April, May, and June of 1977, the Metcalf Subcommittee con
ducted hearings to address various issues that had been raised in the
Senate Staff Report. The Metcalf Subcommittee issued a report in
November 1977, based on an analysis of the Senate Staff Report, the
record of its hearings, and other documentary m a t e r i a l s . 21This
Senate Report covered a broad spectrum of subjects, including the
question of scope of services.
The Senate Report noted that some witnesses testified that the
furnishing of certain management advisory services by auditors to
audit clients reflected adversely on the stated ideals of the profession
and on independence and that accounting firms may be in a position
to compete unfairly for business offered by other consultants.22 Ex
pressing concern with this testimony, the Metcalf Subcommittee con
cluded that accounting firms should perform for audit clients only
services related to accounting.23 This would prohibit the furnishing of
such services as “executive recruitment, marketing analysis, plant
layout, product analysis, and actuarial services.”24 In addition, the
Senate Report stated that all placement activities25 should be disconconflict would arise if such a firm furnished MAS to audit clients. In deter
mining the existence or nonexistence of conflicts of interest which jeopardize
independence, the Board perceives no basis for distinguishing the “Big Eight”
from other accounting firms. Indeed, as discussed in note 36, infra, the smaller
CPA firms seem not to want separate and more permissive treatment based
upon their size or the size and nature of their clientele.
21. Senate Report, supra note 4.
22. While the Subcommittee generally agreed with the Cohen Commission’s
Report of Tentative Conclusions issued in March 1977, it registered some dis
agreement in the area of scope of services. The Board has not thought it
appropriate to address the question of unequal competition.
23. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 17.
24. Ibid.
25. The phrase “placement activities” generally refers to the practice of
assisting employees of the accounting firm in locating employment outside the
firm, including employment with audit clients of the firm. The motivation, at
least for the larger firms, to provide such placement services largely arises
from the “leveraged” structure of those firms. Most young CPAs hired by
these firms never become partners, and they know this. One reason able
graduates accept such a competitive environment is the belief that, whether
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tinued as well. The Metcalf Subcommittee indicated that the only
management advisory services which it believed were appropriate
were “providing certain computer and system analyses . . . necessary
for improving internal control procedures of corporations.”26
In addition to the inquiry by the Metcalf Subcommittee, the Sub
committee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Moss Subcommittee) has con
ducted hearings related to the role of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in establishing accounting principles and overseeing
the profession generally.2
7
The Congressional interest in the profession, as evidenced by the
work of the Metcalf Subcommittee and the Moss Subcommittee,
prompted the accounting profession to undertake a program of in
creased self-regulation. At its annual meeting in September 1977,
the AICPA approved a comprehensive plan which involved the
establishment of a Division for CPA Firms of the AICPA and two
sections of that Division—the SEC Practice Section and the Private
Companies Practice Section.28 In addition, the Public Oversight
Board was established to conduct continuing oversight of all activities
of the SEC Practice Section.
The scope of services question under review by the Board arises in
the context of the standards for eligibility to become a member of, or
retain membership in, the SEC Practice Section. A document en
titled “Organizational Structure and Functions of the SEC Practice
Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms” (Organization
Document) sets forth the objectives of the SEC Practice Section, the
membership eligibility criteria, structure of various operating com
mittees and governing bodies, the functions of the Public Oversight
Board, peer review information, and other matters.
As initially approved by the Executive Committee of the SEC Prac
tice Section, the Organization Document provides that members of
that Section should refrain from providing MAS to audit clients who
are SEC reporting companies where providing such services would
or not they want to become partners or fail to be invited, they will have
attractive alternative career opportunities.
26. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 17.
27. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., Reform and Self-Regulation Efforts of the Accounting
Profession (Committee Print 1978).
28. Members of the AICPA are individuals, not firms. The significance of
the new division was to provide a facility for some form of self-regulatory
controls over firms. Participation in either section, of course, is voluntary and
is achieved by submitting an application and agreeing, among other things, to
abide by all of the requirements for section membership.
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impair independence or where such services are predominantly com
mercial in character, inconsistent with the firm’s professional status
as certified public accountants, and inconsistent with the firm’s re
sponsibilities to the public. The Organization Document also states
that, in determining which MAS to perform, primary emphasis
should be placed on “accounting and financial related areas.” Psycho
logical testing, conducting public opinion polls, and merger and acqui
sition work for a finder’s fee are expressly prohibited. Additional pro
scriptions and guidance are contained in Appendices A and B to the
Organization Document. Appendix A addresses two specific services
—marketing consulting and plant layout.29 Effective July 26, 1978,
the Executive Committee approved adding Appendix B, which em
bodies limitations on performing executive search services.30 The
text of the existing scope limitations contained in the Organization
Document appears in Addendum A to this report.
While the scope of services membership criteria remains as described
above and as reflected in Addendum A hereto, on May 8, 1978, the
Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section tentatively ap
proved certain changes in those criteria, subject to obtaining the views
of the Board on this subject.3
1
As proposed to be revised, the membership eligibility criteria re
lating to scope of services would prohibit members of the SEC Prac
tice Section from furnishing services to audit clients who are SEC
reporting companies when such services (1) impair the firm’s indepen
dence in expressing an opinion on financial statements of that client
or (2) require skills not related to accounting or auditing. The details
of these criteria, including a discussion of specific services which do
and do not satisfy the criteria, are embodied in proposed Appendix A
to the Organization Document. The proposed amendment to that
Document and the proposed new Appendix A thereto appear as Ad
dendum B to this report and are discussed in the Notice.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has also expressed views
on this subject. In Securities Act Release No. 5869 (September 26,
1977), the Commission solicited public comment on proposals calling
for disclosure in proxy statements of audit and other fees incurred by
the registrant during the year and also asked for comment on several
questions relating to restricting the scope of services accountants can
perform for audit clients.
29. See pp. 46-48 infra.
30. See pp. 53-54 infra.
31. As indicated above, at its meeting on July 26, 1978, the Executive Com
mittee approved that portion of the proposal relating to executive recruiting
services.
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In June 1978, ASR 25032 was released, announcing amendments
to certain rules requiring disclosure in proxy statements of the various
services furnished by a registrant’s auditor during the year, the per
centage relationship the aggregate fee for all nonaudit services bears
to the audit fee, and the percentage relationship each nonaudit service
(describing the service if more than 3 percent) bears to the audit
fee.33 In ASR 250 the Commission indicated that it had not yet
determined to propose rules limiting the scope of services but would
await the conclusions and recommendations of the Board. The Board
understands that some people react to SEC disclosure requirements
as though the matters to be disclosed somehow represent unlawful or
improper business practices. Such a reaction may unnecessarily result
in a loss of some MAS advice for audit clients.
The Commission again addressed the scope of services question in
a Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Account
ing Profession and the Commission’s Oversight Role, dated July 1,
1978.34 In that report the Commission cited three basic questions to
be resolved: (1) whether fees from management advisory services
could be so large as to affect the accountant’s objectivity in conducting
the audit; (2) whether certain services are so unrelated to the normal
experience of auditors that it is inconsistent with the concept of
being an accounting or auditing professional to perform those services;
and (3) whether certain services are so closely linked to the account
ing function that performing them will, in the course of an audit,
place the auditor in the position of reviewing his own work. The Com
mission again noted that the Board was reviewing this matter and
that it would await the Board’s views before deciding to take any
action.
32. See note 13, supra.
33. The rule changes announced in ASR 250 also require registrants to dis
close whether the audit committee or board of directors approved each pro
fessional service furnished by the principal accountant and considered the
possible effect on independence and whether such approval and consideration
was given before or after the service was provided.
In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 25 (November 2, 1978) the Commission’s
staff advised that it would be acceptable to state that there was advance
approval of services where board of directors or audit committee approves
a generic category of services, at least annually, and where such approval
includes a limitation regarding the magnitude of the services and a subsequent
review to compare the services rendered with such approval.
Of course, an unanticipated occasion for a particular MAS service might
arise between meetings of the audit committee or board. There are several
reasonable ways to handle such an occurrence, the disclosure of which should
cause no embarrassment to the client or the CPA firm.
34. SEC Report to Congress, supra note 4.
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Discussion of Scope Limitations
Approach to Problem
As is indicated by the extensive record, including the formal record
of the Board’s proceedings and other documentary material concern
ing this matter, the limitations on the types of services auditors should
furnish to audit clients have been studied intensely. It is apparent
that these continuing studies have produced very few conclusions
which constitute a consensus. Perhaps the only conclusion everyone,
or almost everyone, agrees with is that rendering some manage
ment advisory services to audit clients is perceived by some persons
as creating a situation in which an auditor’s independence could be
impaired.35 There also seems to be some consensus, however, that
some services are not appropriately performed by certified public
accountants because they derogate the professional image which is
important to maintain.36 Going from these two broad findings to
specific examples of which services should and which should not
be prohibited is no easy task.
In the analysis which follows, the Board has avoided discussing
specific services, except in certain instances. Rather, the Board has
focused its analysis on the general criteria employed by the Executive
Committee of the SEC Practice Section in the Organization Document
and in the proposed revisions to it.
The Board believes that persons should not be prohibited from
engaging in lawful and perhaps beneficial activity unless it is demon
strated that the prohibition serves some necessary purpose and is
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose. Thus, where measures
less draconian than outright prohibition are available they should be
35. POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 10;
C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 34; R. Keating, A. S. Hansen,
Inc., Tr. 94; E. Boynton, American Academy of Actuaries, Tr. 104, 111; C.
Watson, Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice, Tr. 123-28; R. Cardinal,
Lester B. Knight & Associates, Inc., Tr. 139-43; H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin
and Glasser, Tr. 227; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 243-44;
A. B. Frechtman, Robert Half Personnel Agencies, Tr. 340-41.
36. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr.
7, 20-21; W. Mueller, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 12; P. Arnstein, John F.
Forbes & Co., Tr. 47-50; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 245-47;
J. Korreck, Illinois CPA Society, MAS Committee, Tr. 285-86; J. Burton,
Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 313, 317.
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employed and resort to prohibitions utilized only after such other
measures fail.
The Board also believes it is important to bear in mind that impos
ing limitations on the scope of services public accountants can per
missibly perform will not only affect the large accounting firms,
which could probably survive and prosper under whatever rules are
adopted, but will also affect management advisory practitioners within
those firms and small accounting firms and their clients who rely
heavily on a variety of advisory-type services.37
Finally, the Board believes it is important to recognize that MAS
is not a recent and subversive corruption of the pristine role of the
CPA firm as “pure” auditor. History actually has gone the other way,
and modem CPA firms as auditors are perhaps more “pure” than
they have ever been. From a historical perspective, accountancy
has been professionalized largely through the enactment of statutes
encouraging or requiring audits and financial disclosures. For ex
ample, the Federal Reserve Board, created by the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913, encouraged business entities to supply certified financial
statements when seeking to obtain bank notes issued against com
mercial paper. More importantly, the federal securities legislation
enacted in 1933 and 1934 made accountants essential to corporations
required to comply with the financial disclosure laws. This federal
legislation formalized the accountant’s public responsibilities and gave
the profession statutory recognition.
Nevertheless, the accounting profession has never been based solely
37. While any proscription emanating from the SEC Practice Section can only
be imposed directly against members of that Section, the testimony at the
hearings quite clearly demonstrated that virtually all accounting firms would
feel constrained to abide by them. This is particularly true if any proscription
were founded on the claim that an accounting firm providing such a service to
an audit client would not be independent for purposes of expressing an opinion
on that client’s financial statements.
The importance of maintaining independence is so well grounded in auditing
literature and codes of ethics that establishing variations on that theme does not
seem to be a reasonable solution. Accordingly, any decision in this area cannot
nicely be confined to the so-called “Big Eight,” which was the focus of the Sen
ate Report, and other large accounting firms. Spokesmen for smaller account
ing firms were especially vehement in opposing the creation of any “second
class” membership that looked toward allowing them to be less independent or
to appear to be less independent or less “professional” just because they were
small. The Board respects this attitude, so strongly felt and stated, even though
some of the controversy in this area might be resolved by doing that very thing.
POB Hearing Testimony: J. Mason, Jr., The University of Alabama, Tr.
211; H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser, Tr. 222-23; S. Klion, Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 250; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Com
mittee, Tr. 270; S. Hebert, North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Com
mittee, Tr. 301-04; H. Bernstein, Bernstein and Bank, Ltd., Tr. 359, 362.
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on auditing skills. Those who formed the American Association of
Public Accountants in 1887 (renamed the American Institute of
Accountants in 1917 and in 1956, after a merger in 1936 with
the American Society of Certified Public Accountants, renamed the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) were rendering
a variety of services including bookkeeping and management advice,
and were not engaged primarily in auditing.
The first Revenue Act of 1913, authorized by the Sixteenth Amend
ment, also created a boom for accountants capable of handling the new
income tax laws. Most small businessmen suddenly needed expert
assistance to install bookkeeping systems, prepare financial statements
and tax returns, and handle disputes with revenue agents. Since the
first statutes were passed, accountants have been integrally involved
in furnishing a wide variety of tax advisory services.
Accountants also have long engaged in giving management advice
to clients, and, during the last 30 to 35 years, beginning with the
advent of World War II, accountants have enjoyed a rapid growth
in new forms of MAS. This growth in part has been the result of
general postwar corporate growth and the application of new tech
niques and systems approaches to problems developed during the
war which were well suited to accountants.38
Benefits of MAS
While the rendering of management advisory services has been at
tacked from many directions, it has also been praised by credible
sources. Many persons speaking before and submitting written state
ments to the Board, along with periodical literature, comments sub
mitted to the SEC, and several predecessors to this task of exploring
MAS, have illuminated the many benefits that MAS can provide for
audit clients. Even if MAS could arguably be said to taint an auditor’s
appearance of independence, it cannot be denied that much of value
is also produced.
First, from a client’s viewpoint, an accounting firm that has con
ducted an extensive and competent audit is a logical choice when that
client needs management advice. Assuming that the accounting firm
38. For detailed discussions of the growth of accountancy and its many com
ponents in both America and Great Britain see J. Carey, The CPA Plans for the
Future (1965); J. Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession (2 vols. 1969 &
1970); A. Littleton, Accounting Evolution to 1900 (1933); A. Littleton, Essays
on Accountancy (1961); S. Zeff, Forging Accounting Principles in Five Coun
tries: A History and Analysis of Trends (University of Edinburgh Accounting
Lectures (1971)); Studies in the History of Accounting (A. Littleton & B.
Young, eds. (1956)).
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has the competence to render the services needed, its audit clients
will naturally want to take advantage of its knowledge, experience,
organization, and personnel. Each job may begin more quickly and
proceed more efficiently than if the client had to engage a different
firm.39 For many smaller businesses, a requirement to retain separate
accounting firms or other consultants for MAS and audit services
might be cost prohibitive, and might obviously result in a sacrifice of
one or the other, or at least a decrease in the quality of services a
company could afford. Because all concerned parties advocate im
proving accounting services for the benefit of businesses and the pub
lic, such pressures may be counterproductive. At the very least, the
cost savings and quality improvements created by allowing account
ants to provide MAS to audit clients are real benefits that must be
seriously considered.
Second, many persons appearing before the Board asserted that
MAS capabilities within a firm and an audit team enhance audit
quality.40 Audits are improved, it is argued, because a firm with
professionals experienced in MAS has more sophistication in the
increasingly complex and intricate inner workings of business enter
prises. With that broader base of experience and knowledge of a
client’s business such a firm can more effectively conduct an in-depth
audit through more responsible inquiries and evaluations.41
39. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 7677; POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 28;
H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser, Tr. 224; H. Bernstein, Bernstein
and Bank, Ltd., Tr. 360. Letters from: Donald E. Schowengerdt, July 28,
1978; and AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, August 7, 1978, in response to
the Notice.
40. POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 28;
J. Seitz, Touche Ross & Co., Tr. 198-99; H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin and
Glasser, Tr. 225-26; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 238-39; M.
Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 268-69; J. Korreck, Illinois
CPA Society, MAS Committee, Tr. 284; L. Dowell, McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn
& Company, Tr. 290-91; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr.
306; H. Bernstein, Bernstein & Bank, Ltd., Tr. 363. Letters in response to the
Notice from: Eisner & Lubin, July 18, 1978; McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn &
Company, July 31, 1978; and Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, August 7,
1978. Response to Securities Act Release No. 5869: Coopers & Lybrand;
Touche Ross & Co. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra
note 4, at 74-76.
41. In a comment letter submitted before the POB Hearing, John C. Burton,
Columbia Graduate School of Business, and former Chief Accountant of the
SEC, explained some of his own experiences which illustrate the benefits of
MAS in the audit process. In his own words he states:
When I was a staff accountant, one of my clients asked our firm to develop a
system for translating foreign currency statements in U.S. dollar statements for
consolidation purposes. I and a consultant worked on the job and developed an
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As appealing as this argument is, there were some differences of
opinion at the POB hearings as to how this goal of improved audits
is attained. Some testified that persons experienced in MAS are
utilized in almost every audit and thus provide a broader knowledge
to the audit team.42 Others asserted that MAS professionals, although
not assigned to each audit team, are frequently consulted and available
to auditors.43 Still others explained that members of MAS units and
audit divisions often switch from one to another, carrying with them
certain expertise that is naturally incorporated into both areas.4
4
Despite this rather hazy picture that was drawn at the hearings regard
ing the precise mechanics of incorporating MAS capabilities into
audits, all witnesses discussing this subject fervently maintained that
performing MAS led to an improvement in audit quality.45 To foster
understanding in depth of the translation process which would not have occurred
otherwise, and in a subsequent audit I was able to point to certain implications of
particular changes in exchange rates on the client’s statements which required
careful audit consideration.
In a second case, I as a professor was consulting with an accounting firm in the
area of management services research. One of my areas of interest was credit
policy, and the firm was given an engagement to study the credit policy of one
of its large mail order clients who wished to develop an improved system of credit
control. I worked on the engagement with a consultant from the firm’s manage
ment services staff and an audit manager. We assisted in the development of a
credit policy and a system of credit control, and in so doing achieved an under
standing of the variables affecting credit loss for that firm that could never have
been achieved through normal auditing techniques. This understanding was of
great importance to the audit staff in evaluating the adequacy of the client’s allow
ance for uncollectible accounts. In the year prior to the consulting engagement,
the client’s allowance was materially understated in the financial statements and
its income was materially overstated, even though procedures were performed.
In the year following the engagement, the audit staff, assisted by workpapers from
the consulting engagement, were able to appraise the adequacy of the allowance
with far greater accuracy.
For other examples see Letters in response to the Notice from: Laventhol &
Horwath, August 8, 1978; and Coopers & Lybrand, August 10, 1978.
42. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: S. Klion, AICPA, MAS Executive Com
mittee Chairman, Tr. 275-76. See also Response to Securities Act Release No.
5869: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Exhibit II.
43. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser,
Tr. 230-33; S. Hebert, North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Committee,
Tr. 302.
The Board urges the Executive Committee to consider what formal pro
cedures, if any, accounting firms should be encouraged or required to institute
in order to realize audit benefits from furnishing MAS, taking into account the
need to maintain independence. E.g., the comments of S. Burton recited at
note 129, supra.
44. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Com
mittee, Tr. 272-73; S. Klion, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 276.
45. One response to critics who assert that MAS creates the potential for
self-review is to isolate the MAS practitioners from the audit staff so that no
individual will be reviewing his own work. Carried to its extreme, this sug-
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continued improvement the Board believes that accounting firms
should apply their MAS expertise to the audit function to the fullest
extent possible.
Another benefit of MAS appears to be the quality of young
professionals who are attracted to accounting firms because of the
opportunity to practice MAS. Time and again the Board heard
testimony that the best and brightest students emerging from busi
ness schools are most interested in firms that will afford them the
opportunity to work in the MAS area.46 Whether these students event
ually do practice MAS, or do so only for a while, the availability of
broader experience beyond that of auditing makes some accounting
firms more attractive. Because the audit function is highly important
to the SEC Practice Section, given its critical function for reporting
companies, the Board is sensitive to the needs of accounting firms that
perform audits to strengthen their ranks with the brightest profes
sionals available. Consequently, this benefit of MAS to the account
ing profession and to the public, who must rely on the work product
of these professional auditors, can also be considered an important
one.
There are other advantages to allowing accountants to provide
MAS to audit clients in addition to attracting bright students and
enhancing audit quality. One is that an auditor who also has some
responsibility for advising its client on internal financial controls can
facilitate an audit by improving the underlying structure of what is
audited.47 Auditors are naturally aware of deficiencies in informa
tion systems. If they can work with a client to improve a system the
result is twofold. First, future audits should be less costly because
they will be more easily accomplished. Second, improved controls
will in turn make financial statements more accurate and reliable be
cause the system on which they are based is equally so. Thus, a great
benefit can be seen in allowing an accounting firm to communicate
to a client weaknesses and defects observed in an audit and also to
gestion results in a significant diminution of the benefit MAS may bring to an
audit. As long as the MAS personnel abide by the existing standards requiring
that they limit their role to that of advisers, the problem of self-review, in large
measure, is solved.
46. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: J. Seitz, Touche Ross & Co., Tr. 195; M.
Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 268-69; J. Burton, Columbia
Graduate School of Business, Tr. 306, 310. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are
the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 76. Letter in response to the Notice from
J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business.
47. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 75;
POB Hearing Testimony: M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr.
269. Letter in response to the Notice from McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn &
Company, July 31, 1978.
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be retained to make specific recommendations for improvements
through its MAS services.48
Finally, there seems to be a general consensus that maintaining a
competent accounting firm today does mandate a kind of knowledge
broader than in the past.49 As the AICPA’s Committee on Scope and
Structure reported, “a command of more than one field of knowledge
is required if the profession is to be fully responsive to the growing
public need for better and more extensive services.”50 The growing
complexities within the profession are illustrated not only by the kinds
of services that are in demand, but also by newly developing account
ing principles and techniques. For example, new concerns with the
effects of inflation and certain required disclosures of larger companies
have caused accountants to deal with much more “soft” information
than in the past. Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission
recently called for the development and implementation of a method
of accounting that provides for recognition in financial statements of
proved oil and gas reserves as assets and of changes in proved oil and
gas reserves in e a r n in g s .51Whether this “reserve recognition account
ing” is actually feasible remains uncertain, but the future task of work
ing on its development is clearly going to be difficult, as recognized by
the Commission, because traditional accounting methods do not ade
quately provide for recognition of the discovery of oil and gas. The
48. Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, added to that Act by the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, creates an affirmative obligation on each issuer
of securities, subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, to
establish and maintain a system of internal controls sufficient to provide reason
able assurances that certain stated standards are met. Accounting firms are
already actively engaged in providing advice and assistance to audit clients in
meeting these requirements which go well beyond matters of accounting and
bookkeeping.
In this vein a partner of a major accounting firm recently made the follow
ing observation:
To restrict [MAS] would be particularly shortsighted and unwise at this time be
cause the SEC is virtually certain to demand in the near future that public com
panies report on the quality of their internal controls.
W. Hanson, “Public Accountancy And The Domino Theory,” Mid-Hudson
Business Journal, Harrison, New York (January 2, 1979).
49. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: N. Auerbach, Coopers & Lybrand, Tr.
89-90; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 268-69; J. Korreck,
Illinois CPA Society, MAS Committee, Tr. 284; L. Dowell, McGladrey, Han
sen, Dunn & Company, Tr. 290-91. Letter in response to the Notice from:
AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, August 7, 1978; Touche, Ross & Co.,
August 17, 1978; Ralph E. Kent, August 7, 1978; and Donald E. Schowengerdt,
July 28, 1978.
50. 1974 Final Report, supra note 4, at 24.
51. Accounting Series Release No. 253 (August 31, 1978).
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inherent imprecision of estimates of proved oil and gas reserves further
guarantees that this new accounting for oil and gas production will
require skills and expertise that many accountants do not now possess.52
Some or all of the several benefits mentioned above are present in
the wide array of MAS being performed today. It is impossible, how
ever, for the Board to measure, in the abstract, the precise benefit
accruing from each possible service and concluding whether furnishing
that service to audit clients should be permitted. In any event, the
Board does not believe it is necessary at this time to engage in such
abstract analysis. For one thing, the possible benefit is only one factor
to consider. The others include the fact that impairment of inde
pendence in fact has not been demonstrated and impairment of the
appearance of independence can be cured with greater awareness.
SEC Practice Section— Existing and
Proposed Scope Limitations
As indicated above, the Organization Document provides that a
member of the SEC Practice Section may not perform services for
audit clients that will impair that member’s independence and that
primary emphasis should be on services which are in accounting and
financial related areas. The Proposal embraces the independence
criteria and adds to it the requirement that the services require skills
related to auditing and accounting. The Board understands that the
“accounting and financial related areas” standard and the “auditing
and accounting skills” proposed standard both are designed generally
to proscribe services which may be incompatible with accounting or
which may tarnish the profession’s image.
Although notions of compatibility or image have been discussed
for many years, until incorporated in the standards for membership
in the SEC Practice Section, very few attempts had been made to
identify the class of activity which might impinge on them. Inde
pendence, on the other hand, has been a concept with which the pro
fession has had to live for many years and which has resulted in
numerous interpretations both by the Securities and Exchange Com
mission and the AICPA. The requirement that accountants be in
dependent of their clients when issuing opinions on financial state-

52. The new demands on the accounting profession have also been recognized
by the United States General Accounting Office, in which over 50 percent of the
professional staff have basic skills in areas other than accounting. W. Dreher
and C. Graese, “The Compatibility of Actuarial Consulting and Auditing
Services,” supra note 4, at 38. See also letter in response to the Notice from
Ralph E. Kent, August 7, 1978.
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ments is embodied in the AICPA’s Code of Professional E t h i c s , and
35
the requirement extends to rendering reports on financial statements to
any client of the accountant, whether or not that client is subject to
the reporting requirements of the federal securities laws. There is no
question, therefore, that an accountant, in deciding whether to per
form a particular service for an audit client, must determine whether
performing that service will impair his independence with respect to
the audit.
The compatibility or image criterion contained in the Organization
Document— whether stated as services which are in financial or ac
counting areas or which require skills related to auditing or account
ing—poses a more difficult question for the Board because it remains
unresolved by the profession and the SEC. It is necessary to ask
whether that criterion serves any necessary or useful purpose and
whether it is susceptible of sufficiently definite articulation to make it
meaningful. As indicated in the Conclusions and Recommendations
section, the Board believes that the compatibility criterion should not
be imposed, at least at this time.
Compatibility or Image Criterion

A substantial number of persons testifying at the Board’s hearings and
submitting written comments in response to the Notice criticized the
audit and accounting skill related criterion embodied in the Proposal.
Some witnesses argued that the only relevant criterion is independence,
urging complete elimination of the skill related criterion or any similar
types of criteria, such as accounting and financial related areas pre
sently contained in the Organization Document.54 Others urged that
some criteria limiting services to areas compatible with accounting or
to auditing and accounting related areas be employed as an alternative
to skill related criteria.55
Witnesses and commentators who favored some compatibility cri
teria, but not those based on skills, were concerned primarily that the
skill criteria would be virtually useless, being susceptible of permitting
53. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 50 et seq.
54. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: N. Auerbach, Coopers & Lybrand, Tr. 73;
H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 171, 175; J. Mason, Jr., The Uni
versity of Alabama, Tr. 205; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee,
Tr. 270; J. Korreck, Illinois CPA Society, MAS Committee, Tr. 283; S. Hebert,
North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Committee, Tr. 296.
55. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 6-9,
18-20; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 244-51; J. Burton,
Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 313.
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nearly any type of service, depending on one’s interpretation.56 A
broad interpretation could effectively reduce the purported limitation
to a meaningless obstacle and a poorly veiled subterfuge. Some wit
nesses, however, suggested that a limitation couched in terms of audit
ing and accounting related areas, as opposed to skills, would be less
susceptible of a broad interpretation and would more effectively limit
services to those which are compatible with auditing or accounting.57
The desire to achieve compatibility was alternatively expressed as a
desire to preserve the accountants’ image or dignity as professionals.58
Witnesses and commentators opposed to any criteria, save inde
pendence, believed that the skill related criterion embodied in the
Proposal was illogical and wholly unrelated to the quality of audits.59
If the standard is to improve an accountant’s image or prevent the de
terioration of that image, it will be ineffectual if applied only to serv
ices rendered to audit clients who are SEC reporting companies. From
the standpoint of image the danger exists that accountants might ap
pear to have converted a professional practice into a commercial en
terprise. The appearance of commercialism relates to the types of serv
ices performed, not the nature of the person for whom they are per
formed. This, of course, is in sharp contrast to the concerns related
to independence.
In sum, there was significant support for the conclusions that a skill
related criterion was unnecessary because it was unrelated to the
quality of audits, was unworkable and meaningless because it was sus
ceptible of any convenient interpretation, and was an inappropriate
and ineffectual gesture to assuage political critics who would not be
satisfied in any event.
The Board agrees with those witnesses who have urged that any
limitation on services be predicated only on the requirement that serv
ices not be furnished to audit clients if furnishing such services would
impair the accountant’s independence in rendering an opinion on that
client’s financial statements. Nevertheless, the Board is sympathetic
56. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 7,
18-19; Letter in response to the Notice from A.M, Pullen & Co., August 2, 1978.
57. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 7,
20; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 313.
58. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: P. Arnstein, John F. Forbes & Company,
Tr. 54; R. Mautz, Ernst & Ernst, Tr. 152, 161; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., Tr. 245.
59. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr.
28-30; N. Auerbach, Coopers & Lybrand, Tr. 73-74; R. Mautz, Ernst & Ernst,
Tr. 153; H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 171, 175; J. Mason, Jr., The
University of Alabama, Tr. 205; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr.
237; S. Hebert, North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Committee, Tr. 296.
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with those who expressed some concern with respect to image or com
patibility. The Board views compatibility as a limitation which would
enhance image but not necessarily to the exclusion of other limitations.
Accordingly, the Board has chosen to discuss the subject in terms of
image.
The early studies and analyses of scope of services recognized a dis
tinction between those services which seemingly impaired the appear
ance of independence and those services which arguably impaired
image.60 In fact, services which raise image questions are, as a general
matter, so unrelated to what is generally thought to be an accountant’s
role, that concern for maintaining independence is hardly an issue.6
1
The converse is also true. Services most related to accounting and
auditing and auditing generally seem to be those services which may
impair independence or the appearance of independence.62
60. In its 1969 Final Report, the Ad Hoc Committee made the following
observation:
Services which apear unrelated to the accounting function, in its broadest sense,
have been singled out for criticism. The committee believes that the critics are
not so much concerned about their relation to audit independence . . . as their
seeming incongruity with traditional accounting practice.
1969 Final Report, supra note 4, at 54. But see Hartley and Ross, “MAS and
Audit Independence: An Image Problem,” supra note 4, whose survey suggests
that there is a significant correlation from a perception standpoint between
services which could impair independence and those which are incompatible
with the image of an accountant.
61. This does not mean that the performance of services wholly unrelated to
accounting or auditing could never pose independence problems. Certainly if,
on a continuing basis, the magnitude, in terms of revenue of such unrelated
services to any one client, became very large in relation to the audit services,
serious questions would be raised with respect to independence. The Board is
not prepared to speculate as to the point at which the relationship between audit
and nonaudit fees poses such a problem. But, based on existing data concerning
fee relationships, the Board is satisfied that that point has not been reached on a
broad and continuing scale. See note 65, infra. More will be known on this
subject as 1979 proxy statements containing the information called for by
ASR 250 become available.
62. Letter in response to the Notice from J. Burton, Columbia University
Graduate School of Business, August 2, 1978.
This is also apparent from two of the three general questions posited by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in the SEC Report to Congress. The two
questions were stated as follows:
Are there some services which are so unrelated to the normal expertise and experi
ence of auditors that it is inconsistent with the concept of being an auditing profes
sional for auditors to perform those services?
Are there, conversely, some services so closely linked to the accounting function
that, for the auditor to perform those services for his client means that, the auditor
will, in conducting the audit, be in a position of reviewing his own work?
SEC Report to Congress, supra note 4, at 12.
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The Board recognizes that professional image is important to main
tain since it can bear on the public’s confidence in financial state
ments.63 And, maintaining such confidence is one of the primary rea
sons for requiring that auditors be independent of their clients.64 The
Board is concerned that accounting firms may tarnish their image as
professional organizations if they appear ready, willing, and able to
hawk any service for a profit.
The potential impairment to image, would, in the Board’s view,
result from a dilution or perceived dilution of an accounting firm’s pri
mary service— auditing and accounting. This dilution can manifest
itself in terms of the number and types of nonaccounting or nonaudit
ing services which are offered or in the amount of total revenues
derived from such other services in relation to revenues from auditing
and accounting services.65
While the Board is concerned with the possibility that broad-scale
expansion by accounting firms into new areas may impair the profes
sion’s image, it does not believe that the nature and extent of manage
ment advisory services generally furnished in today’s environment war
rant anything more than sounding an alarm.66 If the problem were
63. The concern is not related to competence, as some have apparently be
lieved. An accounting firm can train or hire competent people as well as any
other organization or group of people, and, under current Professional Standards
relating to MAS, practitioners must have, before undertaking an engagement,
“competence in the analytical approach and process, and in the technical sub
ject matter under consideration.” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1,
MS § 120.
The concern also is not related to independence. If it were, the standard
would be redundant since the AICPA’s Professional Code of Ethics and the
membership criteria relating to independence already have established the
required restriction.
64. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 110.03.
65. The SEC has suggested that aggregate MAS fees from an audit client, by
their very size relative to the audit fee, may tend to corrupt—presumably the
CPA firm will be motivated to be “friendly” in its auditing in order to retain
the MAS revenues. See note 62, supra. At the Board’s hearing, each CPA
witness who Was asked denied the cogency of this argument, citing the fact that
all larger firms, at least, are dominated by audit-oriented CPAs and will con
tinue to be; that aggregate CPA firm revenues from MAS, at least for the larger
firms, are significantly less than audit revenues; and that, in any event, the
exposure to money damages and worse from poor audits make it folly to
compromise an audit to get or buy MAS business, and all members of the
SEC Practice Section realize this. The Board tends to agree in theory with the
SEC but accepts the practical response of the CPA witnesses, at least in present
circumstances. Under present disclosure requirements of the SEC Practice
Section and the SEC, if the relative proportions change, that fact will be easily
observable.
66. The Board does not believe that the scope and extent of management ad-
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susceptible of rulemaking in a manner which was meaningful but
which did not impede normal and proper growth in the dynamic area
of auditing, the Board might be more inclined to agree with a rulemak
ing approach, specifying acceptable and unacceptable MAS. For the
time being the Board believes the profession should recognize the po
tential problem and individual firms should exercise self-restraint and
not venture into new areas of MAS which may impinge on their pro
fessional image. This is perhaps even more true with respect to the
larger and medium-sized accounting firms that have a public visibility
through their auditing of publicly-held corporations.
The Board is also mindful that the marketplace should serve as a
self-correcting device insofar as image is concerned. If furnishing a
wide array of services does tarnish a particular firm’s professional
standing, that should result in audit clients looking elsewhere for their
needed auditing services. With the increased disclosure occasioned
by ASR 250 and the requirement that members of the SEC Practice
Section file annually with the Section a disclosure statement, includ
ing disclosure of gross fees for all services— accounting and auditing,
tax, and management advisory services67— expressed as a percentage
of total gross fees, public awareness should play a larger role in shaping
the scope of services accounting firms are willing to furnish.
Independence
Stated standards on independence

Independence has traditionally been defined by the profession as the
ability to act with integrity and objectivity. Integrity is equivalent to
honesty or to trustworthiness and incorruptibility even in the face of
strong pressure. Objectivity has been described as the “lack of bias
and resistance to any conscious or subconscious influence toward ac
tion, inaction, conclusions or statements that are based on anything
other than an impartial evaluation of the best available evidence.”68
visory services performed at present suggests any dilution of accounting firms’
primary service. The record indicates that management advisory services repre
sent a small percentage of total revenues. Information submitted by the “Big
Eight” firms to the Metcalf Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Manage
ment, January, 1976, revealed that MAS, both to audit clients and nonaudit
clients, generated from 5 to 16 percent of these firms’ total revenues. In letters
submitted in response to Securities Act Release No. 5869 (September 26, 1977),
these same firms reported percentage revenues ranging from 5 to 19 percent,
and some smaller firms reported that MAS comprised 3.54 to 11 percent of total
revenues. With additional public disclosure, discussed on page 44, this will be an
item easy to monitor on an ongoing basis.
67. Organization Document, Section IV, 3, (g)(12). See pp. 43-44, infra, for
additional disclosure recommended by the Board.
68. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 77.
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While it is, of course, essential that an auditor preserve his objectivity
and integrity from his own viewpoint, commonly called “independence
in fact,” it is also important that the auditor appear independent to all
users of the financial information he provides. This latter concept is a
key ingredient to the value of the audit function, since users of audit
reports must be able to rely on the independent auditor. If they per
ceive that there is a lack of independence, whether or not such a de
ficiency exists, much of that value is lost.69
As the Auditing Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA
has explained:
It is of utmost importance to the profession that the general public
maintain confidence in the independence of independent auditors. Pub
lic confidence would be impaired by evidence that independence was
actually lacking, and it might also be impaired by the existence of cir
cumstances which reasonable people might believe likely to influence
independence. To be independent, the auditor must be intellectually
honest; to be recognized as independent, he must be free from any ob
ligation to or interest in the client, its management, or its owners.
For example, an independent auditor auditing a company of which he
was also a director might be intellectually honest, but it is unlikely that
the public would accept him as independent since he would be in effect
auditing decisions which he had a part in making. Likewise, an auditor
with a substantial financial interest in a company might be unbiased
in expressing his opinion on the financial statements of the company,
but the public would be reluctant to believe that he was unbiased. In
dependent auditors should not only be independent in fact; they should
avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their independence.70

To prevent a public perception of a lack of independence, the ac
counting profession has endeavored to prohibit an accountant from
expressing an opinion on financial statements when certain relation
ships exist between auditor and client. According to the AICPA’s
Professional Standards, an auditor’s integrity and objectivity may be,
or may appear to be, threatened by the existence of “(1) certain finan
cial relationships with clients and (2) relationships in which a CPA is
virtually part of management or an employee under management’s
control.”71 As a general matter, only the latter relationship is relevant
to the scope of services issue.72
69. A. Arens and J. Loebbecke, Auditing: An Integrated Approach (PrenticeHall, 1976).
70. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, AU § 220.03.
71. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52.10.
72. Both the existing and proposed scope limitations contained, and proposed
to be contained, in the Organization Document prohibit engaging in MAS on a
contingent fee basis. This is a sound restriction and shoud be retained. Other-
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There are three major rules promulgated by the AICPA that pro
vide the framework for the independence requirement. First, the sec
ond general auditing standard states that: “In all matters relating to
the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be main
tained by the auditor or a u d i t o r s . "73Second, the Concepts of Profes
sional Ethics contains the following statement: “A certified public ac
countant should maintain his integrity and objectivity and, when
engaged in the practice of public accounting, be independent of those
he serves.”74 Third, Rule 101 of the Rules of Conduct provides spe
cific instances of compromised independence.75 The AICPA’s Pro
fessional Ethics Division and Management Advisory Services Division
have also issued pronouncements regarding the relationships between
management advisory services and independence.76
The AICPA can expel from the organization any member who is
found to have violated its Rules of Conduct. Although such a con
sequence would be a “weighty social and economic sanction,” expul
sion from the AICPA does not prevent an accountant from practicing
his profession.77 Each state controls accountants in public practice
wise, the accounting firm would, in the Board’s view, have a financial relation
ship with the client which would impair its independence. A prohibition on
contingent fees also is part of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Ethics,
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 302.
73. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, AU § 220.01. The membership
of the AICPA has officially adopted ten broad statements collectively entitled
“Generally Accepted Auditing Standards.’’ These auditing standards deal with
measures of the quality of the performance of auditing procedures and the ob
jectives to be attained by the use of the procedures undertaken.
74. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52. The Concepts of Pro
fessional Ethics is a philosophical essay approved by the professional ethics divi
sion of the AICPA. The essay suggests behavior which CPAs should strive for
beyond the minimum level of acceptable conduct set forth in the Rules of Con
duct, infra note 75, and is not intended to establish enforceable standards.
75. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.01. The Rules of Con
duct consists of enforceable ethical standards and requires the approval of the
membership of the AICPA before the Rules become effective.
76. Pronouncements of the Management Advisory Services Division are “Man
agement Advisory Services Practice Standard No. 1— Personal Characteristics,”
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 110; “Tentative Description of
the Nature of Management Advisory Services by Independent Accounting
Firms,” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 410; and “Role in Man
agement Advisory Services,” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 430.
Pronouncements of the Professional Ethics Division are Interpretation No. 3 of
Rule 101 of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics, AICPA, Professional
Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.04; and various ethics rulings on independence,
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 191.
77. A. Arens and J. Loebbecke, Auditing: An Integrated Approach, supra
note 4, at 33.
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within its borders by a licensing procedure and, thus, only a state
board can prevent an accountant from practicing by revoking his
license. Because all state boards have rules of conduct substantially
similar to the AICPA’s, an accountant could be removed from public
practice for failure to maintain independence during an audit, al
though this happens infrequently.78
The Securities and Exchange Commission has also addressed the
question of independence on sundry occasions over the years. In order
to ensure public confidence in the objective reporting of financial in
formation, certain rules, particularly Rule 2-0179 of Regulation S-X
and Rule 2(e)80 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice were adopted.
Generally, Regulation S-X requires that any audited financial state
ments filed with the Commission be audited by an accountant who
satisfies the independence requirements contained in that Regulation.
Under Rule 2(e) the Commission may deny, temporarily or per
manently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way
to any person who is found by the Commission to have, among other
things, engaged in any violation of the federal securities laws or the
rules of the Commission, including its rules relating to independence
contained in Regulation S-X.81
The Commission has consistently held that the question of in
dependence is to be determined in light of all the pertinent circum
stances in a particular case.82 Rule 2-01(b) of Regulation S-X,
however, does set forth certain specific relationships and circum
stances which are so likely to impair independence that the Com
mission will refuse to recognize as independent any accountant having
such a relationship with a client. Generally, Rule 2-01(b)(1) pro
vides that an accountant is not independent if he, his firm, or any
member of his firm has any direct financial interest or any material
indirect financial interest in the client to be audited or any of its af78. Ibid.
79. 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01.
80. 17 C.F.R. 201.2(e).
81. 17 C.F.R. 201.2(e)(1). The Commission has exercised its power to suspend
and censure practitioners many times, with increasing frequency in recent years.
The Accounting Series Releases contain more than 30 cases of temporary or
permanent suspensions of certified public accountants. The majority of these
have occurred within the last 10 years; the SEC has also increasingly accepted
resignations of accountants against whom investigative proceedings have been
initiated.
The authority of the Commission to discipline those who practice before it
was recently reaffirmed in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,415 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
82. See, e.g.. Accounting Series Release No. 47 (January 25, 1944); Account
ing Series Release No. 81 (December 11, 1958); Accounting Series Release No.
126 (July 5, 1972).
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f i l i a t e s . 83A similar provision is embodied in the AICPA’s Rules of
Conduct.84 Both the Commission and the AICPA have interpreted
their rules to prohibit any direct financial interest in a client, no
matter how small.8
5
The Commission and the AICPA have also provided that certain
specific associations between an accountant and his client will impair
independence. For example, Rule 2-01 (b)(2) of Regulation S-X86
and AICPA Rule of Conduct 101B87 generally provide that an ac
countant will not be independent of any client with which he, his firm,
or a member thereof was, during the period to be reported on or at
the date of the report, connected as promoter, underwriter, voting
trustee, director, officer, or employee.8
8
These two basic rules— no financial interests and no prohibited
business relationships or associations—form the foundation for several
interpretations concerning independence. Thus, the Commission and
the AICPA have issued interpretations and rulings relating to family
relationships of auditors and clients,89 indemnity agreements between
auditors and clients,90 financial interests in, or official association with,
clients by retired partners of auditors,91 litigation between and involv
ing auditors and clients,92 and auditor performance of bookkeeping
services for clients.9
3
83. 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(b).
84. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.01.
85. For the Commission’s rulings, see, e.g., Accounting Series Release No. 22
(March 14, 1941); Accounting Series Release No. 81 (December 11, 1958);
Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972). For the profession’s rulings,
see AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 191, et seq.
86. 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(b)(2).
87. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.01.
88. See Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972) and Accounting
Series Release No. 234 (December 13, 1977) for other business relationships
which raise independence questions.
89. E.g., Accounting Series Release No. 234 (December 13, 1977); Accounting
Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972); AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2,
ET §§ 101.05, 191.043-.054, and 191.099-.100.
90. Accounting Series Release No. 22 (March 2, 1941).
91. E.g., Accounting Series Release No. 234 (December 13, 1977); AICPA,
Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET §§ 101.03, 191.029-.030, and 191.073-.074.
92. E.g., Accounting Series Release No. 251 (July 6, 1978); Accounting
Series Release No. 234 (December 13, 1977); AICPA, Professional Standards,
Vol. 2, ET § 101.07.
93. E.g., Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1976); AICPA, Pro
fessional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.04. For a discussion of this subject, see
C. Blough, Practical Applications of Accounting Standards 67-69 (AICPA
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There have also been specific interpretations and general statements
from the Commission and the AICPA concerning the furnishing of
MAS by auditors. The profession has stated that the role of an in
dependent accounting firm in performing MAS is to provide advice
and technical assistance to a client while providing for participation in
the analytical approach and process.94 This has been stated to be “the
only basis on which the work should be done and it is the only basis on
which responsible management should permit it to be done.”95 Indeed,
AICPA Ethics opinions provide that if the auditor makes manage
ment decisions on matters affecting the company’s financial position
or results of operations it could appear that his objectivity as an in
dependent auditor of the company’s financial statements might well be
impaired.96
Rule 101 of the AICPA’s Rules of Conduct precludes a member or
his firm from expressing an opinion on the financial statements of an
enterprise which he or his firm serves in any capacity equivalent to
that of a member of management or of an employee. In furnishing
MAS to audit clients, auditors must take this into account.
In 1958 the Commission commented on the independence of the ac
countant who is so closely identified with his client that he makes
decisions that should be made by management. The Commission
said;
Another reason for finding a lack of independence . . . is the fact that
some accountants intending to certify financial statements included in
such filings have been interested in serving the client’s management,
or in some cases large stockholders, in several capacities and in doing
so have not taken care to maintain a clear distinction between giving
1957), and J. Carey and W. Doherty, Ethical Standards of the Accounting Pro
fession 37-39 (AICPA 1966).
94. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 410.01.
95. Ibid.
96. AICPA’s Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 12, “Independ
ence,” 1963.
Adhering to the role limitation is more difficult with respect to small clients
than with large ones, and small CPA firms tend to have a higher portion of
small clients among their total clientele. A small company, the extreme of
which is the “one-man shop,” cannot afford expert staff of its own in many areas.
The owner is much more likely to turn to his CPA firm for advice on many
matters, because of his own lack of time or capacity, and much more likely to
follow the advice given. The testimony of spokesmen for smaller firms heavily
engaged with such clients presented a picture of small CPA firms doing much
good for small businessmen but also a picture of circumstances in which ad
herence to role limitations seemed difficult, to say the least. However, these
same spokesmen strongly rejected an exception based upon smallness, at least
as long as the role limitation is imposed as a condition of independence.
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advice to management and serving as personal representatives of man
agement or owners and making business decisions for them.97
Occasionally a client will seek to engage its independent accounting
firm for a project in which the client wants to be involved only to a
limited extent, if at all. According to the AICPA Committee on
Management Services, an auditor must be wary of a role in which he
assumes exclusive control over the design and implementation of
changes. “Only client management is in a position to assume responsi
bility for all aspects of change (including operations) and, therefore,
ultimate success is most likely to be achieved when both consultant
and client management recognize this fact and arrange their roles
accordingly.”98
Two ethics rulings analyze the problem of impairment of indepen
dence when specific services are involved. First, the AICPA has con
cluded that an accounting firm’s independence would not be impaired
if it provided actuarial services to an audit client (the results of which
are incorporated in the client’s financial statements) where “all of the
significant matters of judgment involved are determined or approved
by the client and the client is in a position to have an informed judg
ment on the results.”99
The second ruling concerns executive search activity. Generally,
AICPA ethics rulings prohibit a member from hiring for a client a
controller or cost accountant since hiring decisions are management
decisions which cannot be made by the auditor without impairing in
dependence. The rulings, however, would permit a member to per
form services, such as “recommending a position description and
candidate specifications, searching for and initially screening candi97. Securities and Exchange Commission, 23rd Annual Report for Fiscal Year
Ended June 30, 1957, at 184 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958).
98. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 430.19. The Committee on
Management Services promulgated the following criteria for accepting an en
gagement which includes implementation:
1. The client understands the nature and implications of the recommended
course of action.
2. Client management has made a firm decision to proceed with implementa
tion based on this understanding and consideration of alternatives.
3. Client management accepts overall responsibility for implementation of the
chosen course of action.
4. Sufficient expertise will be available in the client organization to fully com
prehend the significance of the changes being made during implementation.
5. When the changes have been fully implemented, client personnel have the
knowledge and ability to adequately maintain and operate such systems as
may be involved.
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 430.22.
99. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 191.107-.108.
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dates, and recommending qualified candidates to the client” for the
client’s ultimate decision.100
The AICPA’s interpretations regarding actuarial services and ex
ecutive search reflect the Board view that it has taken on the question
of scope of services and its relation to auditor independence. The
AICPA’s Council, in 1961, stated it to be “an objective of the Insti
tute . . . to encourage all CPAs to perform the entire range of
management services consistent with their professional competence,
ethical standards, and responsibility.”101 In its Opinion No. 12, the
AICPA’s Committee on Professional Ethics determined that “there
is no ethical reason why a member or associate may not properly per
form professional services . . . in the [area of] management advisory
services, and at the same time serve the same client as independent
auditor..."102
The Commission and the AICPA have taken a rigid, prophylactic
approach in pronouncing that certain audit/client relationships will
impair independence. This is most apparent with respect to financial
interests in clients and certain formal associations with clients. In
the area of MAS relationships, however, a more fluid approach has
been embraced. In answering the general question of whether MAS
does impair independence, and, if so, whether it should be proscribed
in any respect, the Board believes that this same fluid approach should
prevail.
The effect of MAS on independence

Actual Impairment. From the voluminous record before the Board,
it is apparent that documented evidence of MAS abuses or impair
ment of independence through the use of MAS is virtually nonexis
tent.103 Many concerned persons point to a feeling that “it doesn’t
100. Ibid., at § 191.111-.112. But see Appendix B to the Organization Docu
ment (Addendum A of this Report) which prohibits members of the SEC Prac
tice Section from engaging in certain executive search services for audit clients
whose securities are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
This is discussed at pp. 82-84, infra.
101. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 410.03.
102. See note 7, supra.
103. The lack of incriminating evidence was mentioned repeatedly at the POB
Hearing. POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr.
28; D. Noonan, Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, Tr. 62; N. Auerbach,
Coopers & Lybrand, Tr. 70; H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 170, 177;
J. Mason, Jr., The University of Alabama, Tr. 207, 216-17; S. Klion, Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 239; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee,
Tr. 283-84; S. Hebert, North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Committee,
Tr. 299; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 305; R. Leisner,
CPA, Tr. 355-56; H. Bernstein, Bernstein & Bank, Ltd., Tr. 363. It is also a
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look right” or a speculation that some services “might” or “could”
impair independence,104 but no one can counter the demonstrated
benefits of MAS with some proof that specific practices lead to actual
impairment. Although charges against MAS are serious and con
ceptually tenable, abolishing services that are deleterious in specula
tion but are beneficial by wide acclaim would be unwise.1
05
The several surveys conducted over the years have suggested that
a minority of financial statement users believe that an accountant’s
independence could be impaired by his furnishing MAS to audit
clients— indicating that furnishing such services may impair the ap
pearance of independence. Evidence of actual impairment resulting
from MAS, however, has been difficult to find. One commentator
from the accounting profession has strongly urged that none in fact
exists:
Despite more than fifteen years of research—much of which conducted
by persons, however sincere their motives, with an apparent precon
ception about the impropriety of MAS—the record of MAS practice
as it relates to audit independence is unblemished: Not a single com
promising instance has been presented. Both equity and reason would
seem to suggest that the question has been answered adequately.106
The two special committees established by the AICPA107 to study
this problem failed to find any evidence of actual impairment of in
dependence after years of performance of MAS for audit clients. The
Ad Hoc Committee on Independence interviewed Dr. Arthur Schulte
(author of an article which surveyed the opinion of users of financial
statements regarding the impairment of independence of accountants)
when preparing its own report, and he stated that he had addressed
inquiries to all of the state boards of accountancy asking if they had
ever had any case in which they had to take disciplinary action on in
dependence where the rendition of management services was a factor.
recurrent theme in professional studies on the subject, but the Board is puzzled
as to what weight it should be given. Specific evidence of loss of independence
through MAS, a so-called smoking gun, is not likely to be available even if
there is such a loss. On the other hand, the assumption by congressional staff
and other studies that MAS must corrupt lacks persuasion because of its
a priori foundation without empirical verification.
104. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: E. Boynton, American Academy of
Actuaries, Tr. 106-07; C. Watson, Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice,
Tr. 124-26; R. Cardinal, Lester B. Knight & Associates, Inc., Tr. 138-39.
105. Support for MAS has been widespread among accounting firms that
practice MAS, academics, and client companies. See the discussion of MAS
benefits at pp. 16-21, supra.
106. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 78.
107. Ad Hoc Committee on Independence, 1969 Final Report, supra note 4;
Committee on Scope and Structure, 1974 Final Report, supra note 4.
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He advised the Committee that he had heard from 44 of the state
boards and that not one of them reported it had ever had such a case.
Finally, one mechanism which potentially could reveal whether
the independence of auditors has actually been impaired is our legal
system. Research conducted by the Cohen Commission, however,
produced only one case that could arguably have involved an actual
impairment of independence on the part of auditors.108 One com
mentator cited a few other cases1
09 which were considered by the
Cohen Commission before reaching its conclusion, but, otherwise,
there have been no instances of litigation concerning this issue.110
While the available empirical evidence does not reveal any actual
instances where the furnishing of MAS has impaired independence,
the Board recognizes that the nonexistence of such evidence does not
necessarily mean that there have not been instances where indepen
dence may have been impaired. Not all situations where an auditor’s
objectivity is compromised will result in a lawsuit. Accordingly, the
absence of any known cases, while comforting, does not serve to
prove conclusively that independence has not been, or will not be,
impaired due to the furnishing of MAS to audit clients.1
1
108. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 102. In the Westec case,
auditors advised on the accounting effect of prospective merger transactions and
were involved in the company’s merger and acquisition program. Research
conducted at the University of Texas at Austin yielded similar results. Re
searchers searched U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 1938 to March 1977,
U.S. Court of Appeals decisions from 1945 to April 1977, and U.S. District
Court decisions from 1960 to March 1977 and judicial decisions in courts of
eleven states. Few cases were found which were relevant and none where the
actions of the auditors were determined to be improperly influenced by the
furnishing of MAS to audit clients. G. Grudnitski and J. Robertson, “Addi
tional Evidence on Auditor Independence When Management Services Are
Performed,” College of Business Administration, The University of Texas at
Austin. Received with letter in response to the Notice from Associate Pro
fessor J. Robertson.
109. A. Briloff, More Debits Than Credits (Harper & Row, 1976), 283.
110. The Cohen Commission’s analysis of legal cases did not disclose any other
examples besides those cited by Professor Briloff, and their survey of audit staff
members failed to indicate any significant relationship between the provision of
MAS and substandard audits.
In three of the four cases cited by Professor Briloff, the accountants perform
ing MAS learned of information that reflected unfavorably on the audit and
on unaudited financial statements. As the Cohen Commission Report notes,
the fault was not the result o f a conflict when the audit was performed, but was
the failure to act when learning of adverse facts during the MAS engagement.
The cases suggest that MAS can add strength to the audit process by giving the
auditors access to more information. The fourth case was the Westec case
referred to in note 108, supra. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 97.
111. See note 103, supra.
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Appearance of Impairment. The problem of impairment of inde
pendence when an accounting firm furnishes MAS to an audit client
is not so much lack of independence in fact as the appearance of lack
of independence. Closeness to management, which many persons
view as a by-product of providing MAS, places the auditor in a posi
tion where outside observers become concerned as to his independence.
Surveys of users of financial statements, however, have been in
conclusive regarding the effect of MAS on auditor independence.
These surveys have severally concluded: (i) that there is a problem
with the accountant’s appearance of i n d e p e n d e n c e ;12(ii) there is no
problem in this area;13 or (iii) the evidence is conflicting and no
conclusions may be d r a w n . 14This division in the literature illustrates
the difficulties inherent in measuring such an intangible quality as
the appearance of independence.
The surveys have shown, however, that those people most familiar
with the MAS provided by auditors are far less concerned about a
possible impairment of independence than those who are less familiar
with the situation.115 The difference in perception of a possible im
pairment of independence is related to a knowledge of the scope of
MAS furnished by auditors. This has given rise to the assertion that
an auditor must not only appear to be independent to a reasonable
person in possession of all the facts, but also to an “unreasonable”
person who has no knowledge of this area. Lack of such knowledge
could produce a “psychological” uncertainty as to whether the services
would impair independence.116
112. A. Briloff, “Old Myths and New Realities in Accountancy,” supra note
4, at 484-95; A. Schulte, “Compatibility of Management Consulting and Audit
ing,” supra note 4, at 587-93.
113. P. Titard, “Independence and MAS— Opinions of Financial Statement
Users,” supra note 4, at 47-52.
114. R. Hartley and T. Ross, “MAS and Audit Independence: An Image
Problem,” supra note 4, at 42-51; D. Lavin, “Perceptions of the Independence
of the Auditor,” supra note 4, at 41-51; G. Hobgood and J. Sciarrino, “Man
agement Looks at Audit Services,” supra note 4, at 26-32; G. Hobgood and J.
Sciarrino, “Management Looks at Audit Services (Part II),” supra note 4, at
24-25; D. Miller, “The Annual Audit Revisited,” supra note 4, at 38-44.
115. P. Titard, “Independence and MAS,” supra note 4.
116. Query whether the appearance to a reasonable observer is an adequate
standard. While, on the one hand, it seems unreasonable to ask the profession
to curtail useful, profitable, and harmless activities to cater to the suspicions of
unreasonable observers, if enough observers were to perceive MAS in general
or some types of service in particular as seriously impairing independence, the
profession would be in trouble and should do something about it, even though
the perception was unreasonable and not founded in fact. These considerations
help explain and support the recent ban on executive recruiting services. In
other cases the appropriate professional response might be to use disclosure and
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One commentator has argued that many of the researchers who
questioned the independence of an auditor who performs MAS have
started with the hypothesis that auditing and MAS are somehow
incompatible. Using questionnaires, information was compiled on
the attitudes of informed users of financial statements toward this
hypothesis. “[N]one of these studies developed research findings,
rationale or any specific instance which would justify curtailment of
MAS as currently performed by auditing firms."17
Since some of the surveys discussed above seem to indicate that
the concern of users about the potential conflict between MAS and
the audit function “decreases as their familiarity with the nature of
services offered by public accounting firms increases,”118 a solution
to the appearance issue would seem to be the education of these
“concerned users” through disclosure. It is possible that there may
be a lack of understanding as to the specific role the auditor plays
in rendering MAS.
The AICPA, through its Management Advisory Services Execu
tive Committee, has been successful in informing the CPA of his
expected role in MAS. It may be advisable for the AICPA to in
crease its efforts to provide similar information to members of the
financial community in order to inform them as to what the account
ing profession expects of auditors who render MAS. This would
give users of financial statements a better basis upon which to form
judgments about MAS and independence. In this connection, the
AICPA should place special emphasis on those specific services
perceived to be closely related to management. It still remains the
responsibility of the auditor to take all necessary precautions to
safeguard independence and to avoid acts which may appear to
justify the fears expressed about MAS.
The idea of disclosure and education, however, is not a novel one.
In 1966 the AICPA prepared a document which attempted to edu
cate the general business community regarding the nature of manage
ment advisory services as performed by independent public account
ing f i r m s . The
91
1969 Ad Hoc Committee on Independence recom
mended that in any discussion of MAS with user groups, emphasis
should be placed on the role played by the auditor.120 These past
efforts indicate that any future program of disclosure must be comaudit committee or board of directors surveillance to change the public
perception.
117. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at
77-78.
118. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 96.
119. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol 1, MS § 410.03.
120. 1969 Final Report, supra note 4.
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prehensive and specifically designed to ease the appearance problem
with MAS, Nothing less will suffice.
Independence as an absolute

The existing studies, although generally supportive of the conclusion
that performing MAS does not impair independence in fact, are
quite inconclusive concerning whether any particular management
advisory services impair the appearance of independence. Even con
ceding, for the sake of argument, that furnishing a wide variety of
such services to audit clients does impair the appearance of inde
pendence and assuming that additional public awareness of the true
nature of accountants’ advisory activity will not allay the suspicions
of all observers, the inquiry cannot end there. Independence is not
and never has been a status which public accountants achieve or have
achieved in any absolute sense. Thus, before jumping from a conclu
sion that furnishing certain services to audit clients could result in
the impairment of independence in appearance (or even in fact) to
a conclusion that public accountants be barred from furnishing such
services to their audit clients, it is judicious to look at what other
relationships presently exist between accountants and clients which
raise similar independence questions but which have been accepted
by the profession and the public.
As indicated above, independence has traditionally been defined
by the profession as the ability to act with integrity and objectivity—
integrity being an element of character, and objectivity being an
accountant’s ability to maintain an impartial attitude on all matters
which come under his view. It is this second element of independence
— objectivity— which precludes the attainment of independence in any
absolute sense. A significant conflict of interest exists in every audi
tor/client relationship by virtue of the fact that the client selects the
auditor and pays the fee.121 Acceptance of this conflict is, in part,
based on practical necessity. In addition, a good deal of reliance is
placed on the first element of independence—integrity— in recogniz
ing that objectivity can be compromised to some extent without un
duly impairing independence.12
Similarly, accountants have been performing tax advisory services
121. The existence of this significant conflict was recited on several occasions
during the course of the Board’s hearings. POB Hearing Testimony: P. Arn
stein, John F. Forbes & Company, Tr. 46-47; R. Mautz, Ernst & Ernst, Tr. 152;
H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 176; H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin
and Glasser, Tr. 240; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr.
306; H. Bernstein, Bernstein & Bank, Ltd., Tr. 373.
122. Other pressures to act properly, in accordance with professional standards,
cannot be overlooked. These include legal liability, professional discipline and
loss of reputation. See AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52.08.
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for years. Indeed, one of the more significant factors responsible for
the growth of the accounting profession was the adoption of the
16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913 providing for
federal income tax.123 The public, and certainly the SEC, have been
acutely aware that independent accountants perform a wide array
of tax reporting and advisory services. It is not uncommon for an
accounting firm to be closely involved in assisting management in
determining the provision for taxes appearing on the income state
ment and the accrual appearing on the balance sheet even though
that same firm will review the appropriateness of those provisions in
rendering its opinion on the fairness of the financial statements. Not
withstanding this fact, the public has accepted the audits conducted
by the same accounting firm without undue concern that somehow
independence has been impaired.
Some persons might propose that tax advisory services are dis
tinguishable from MAS because a third party— the U.S. Government
—conducts its own audit, serving as an additional check on the
accountant’s performance.124 Others may argue that tax services are
entitled to some sort of de facto grandfathering in this area, since
they have been performed for so many years.
The Board does not believe the foregoing arguments represent the
primary justification for permitting independent accountants to per
form tax advisory services. The Internal Revenue Service audit, for
example, is not conducted until some years after financial statements
are published—hardly adequate protection for shareholders. While
the argument that tax advisory services simply be accepted under some
theory of grandfathering has some appeal, the Board believes there
are other reasons for accepting tax advisory services which are more
substantive and which bear on the larger question whether accountants
should be permitted to furnish MAS to audit clients.
Accountants historically have assisted management in calculating
the net income of the corporation. Accordingly, accountants were
a natural profession to turn to for assistance in determining taxes
which in large measure are based on net income and other financial
bases requiring utilization of accounting concepts. Financial report
ing and rendering opinions on the fairness of financial statements
require a review and understanding of the appropriateness of the
provisions for taxes appearing on the income statement and the
related accruals appearing on the balance sheet. If tax services
could not be performed by the same accounting firm engaged to
conduct an audit, a significant amount of work would have to be
123. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
124. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony:
Actuaries, Tr. 115.

D. Gustafson, American Academy of
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duplicated without any appreciable public b e n e f i t . 125Indeed, the
Board believes that in some cases the result of separating those func
tions could produce significant economic waste, and in some cases
would deny clients the best tax advice reasonably available to them. In
addition to these benefits realized by the clients, and hence share
holders, furnishing tax advice may result in benefits to the audit
generally due to a more direct awareness of the client’s tax posture
and other factors.126
These practical considerations, coupled with the integrity of the
accounting profession and other external forces which come into
play127 lead
Board to conclude generally that accountants should
not be made to curtail the furnishing of MAS to audit clients; they
also lend further substance to the argument that independence in an
absolute sense has not been achieved historically and probably would
not be desirable to attain even if possible.
Those who have criticized accountants for furnishing MAS to audit
clients have pointed to the potential for self-review, the possibility
of engaging in management decisions, and the possible incentive for
misrepresenting audit results because of a desire to continue furnish
ing MAS.128 These criteria cannot be ignored, but they suggest an
125. Letters in response to the Notice from: McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn &
Company, July 31, 1978; A.M. Pullen & Company, August 2, 1978; John F.
Forbes & Company, August 8, 1978.
126. Letters in response to the Notice from: A. M. Pullen & Company, August
2, 1978; Coopers & Lybrand, August 1978; Touche Ross & Co., August 17,
1978; Hurdman & Cranstoun, August 15, 1978. Responses to Securities Act
Release No. 5869: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. at 8-9; Touche Ross & Co.
at 7.
127. See note 122, supra.
128. The profession, of course, has faced the question of the potential conflict
of interest in performing MAS. The following excerpts from the Concepts of
Professional Ethics reflect this problem:
CPAs continually provide advice to their clients, and they expect that this advice
will usually be followed. Decisions based on such advice may have a significant
effect on a client’s financial condition or operating results. This is the case not only
in tax engagements and management advisory services but in the audit function as
well. . . . It must be noted that when a CPA expresses an opinion on financial
statements, the judgments involved pertain to whether the results of operating de
cisions of the client are fairly presented in the statements and not on the under
lying wisdom of such decisions. It is highly unlikely therefore that being a factor
in the client’s decision-making process would impair the CPA’s objectivity in judg
ing the fairness of presentation. The more important question is whether a CPA
would deliberately compromise his integrity by expressing an unqualified opinion
on financial statements which were prepared in such a way as to cover up a poor
business decision by the client and on which the CPA has rendered advice.
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52.14-.17. See notes 61 and 65
supra, for a discussion of a potential conflict which may result due to a con
tinual disproportionate amount of fees attributable to MAS.
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analysis of independence which disregards the fact that some relation
ships between auditors and clients, even though posing potential con
flicts, are accepted because of practical necessity or because they
produce countervailing benefits. Especially when such other relation
ships are questioned because they impair independence in appearance,
rather than independence in fact, it would be contrary to the public
interest to impose artificial restrictions which will deny the realization
of possible countervailing benefits.
Where there is no countervailing benefit from permitting certain
relationships to exist and where there is not otherwise a practical
necessity for the relationship, more prophylactic measures are entirely
appropriate. This is most apparent with respect to the proscription
of financial relationships. While it may be entirely reasonable to
expect that an independently wealthy accountant has not lost his
independence by owning $100 worth of a client’s stock, the AICPA’s
Code of Professional Ethics and the Securities and Exchange Com
mission rules would not permit such ownership under pronouncements
relating to independence. This approach is justifiable on the ground
that it is easy not to own client stock and owning such stock does
nothing which appears to improve the accountant’s ability to conduct
an audit or otherwise serve any public interest.
Existing Safeguards
The public has accepted the notion that independence in an absolute
sense does not exist, and several factors, some recently created,
constitute substantial procedural safeguards that can further protect
against the impairment of independence of auditors.
Client Awareness and Public Exposure

Due to new disclosure requirements imposed on issuers by the
proxy rules and imposed on members of the SEC Practice Section by
membership criteria of that Section, shareholders and other interested
members of the public will be aware of the extent of MAS furnished
by members of the Section generally and the amount furnished to
individual clients relative to audit services furnished to those clients.
Long a basic premise underlying the federal securities laws, disclos
ure operates to “clear the air” and to reduce suspicion. Most import
antly, disclosure serves to conform conduct to public expectations and
demands.129
129. Reliance on disclosure— as opposed to proscribing special services— was
also part of a program which Professor John C. Burton, former Chief Ac
countant of the SEC, urged the Board to endorse. POB Hearing Testimony:
Tr. 305-306. Professor Burton generally urged that the SEC Practice Section
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ASR 2 5 released
031,
this year, announces new regulations re
quiring companies to disclose in proxy materials all nonaudit engage
ments and the fees therefrom as a percentage of the audit fee.131 It
further requires disclosure of whether the company’s audit committee
or board of directors approved such engagements and whether the
approval was granted before or after commencement of the engage
ment. In the future, therefore, these disclosures will inform share
holders of the magnitude of nonaudit fees compared to audit fees and
whether the amount of nonaudit services disclosed appears appropri
ate.132 They also reveal whether a company’s audit committee or
board of directors gave appropriate consideration to the possible
effect on the auditor’s independence, and ultimately should decrease
concern by shareholders about nonaudit engagements.13
should not adopt scope of services limitations beyond those presently contained
in the AICPA’s Code of Professional Ethics. He did, however, suggest three
positive steps to improve the appearance of independence problem. Professor
Burton urged that (1) the SEC Practice Section peer review include a review of
the reviewed firm’s entire practice, rather than limiting the review to its account
ing and auditing activities; (2) auditing standards be changed to require consulta
tion between the audit staff and the MAS staff and to require the audit staff to
review MAS work papers; and (3) reports filed with the SEC Practice Section
by members should require disclosure of total fees paid by each client, identify
ing the clients and breaking down the components of the total fee between
auditing services, tax services, and MAS.
130. ASR 250, supra note 4. The concept of disclosure was discussed at the
POB Hearing Testimony: H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 172-73;
S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 252-54; J. Burton, Columbia
Graduate School of Business, Tr. 307-08, 318-21, 327-28. Disclosure was also
discussed in most responses to Securities Act Release 5869. The majority of
accounting firms oppose such disclosure.
131. Item 8(g) of Schedule 14A, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,039 (effective
after September 30, 1978). The SEC has recently issued interpretations of the
requirements to guide issuers on how to disclose relationships with independent
public accountants in proxy statements. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 25 (Nov.
2, 1978).
132. The Commission has recognized that the ratification of accountants by
shareholder vote is a desirable action to strengthen the accountant’s independ
ence. Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972). Ratification by more
informed shareholders lends additional support to that position.
133. ASR 250 has received criticism from CPA firms and from business execu
tives on several grounds, and the Board understands that some effort may be
made to persuade the Commission to withdraw of substantially modify the rule
changes announced in that Release. In this report, the Board accepts ASR 250
as a fact and relies in part on the public information that it will produce and
the corporate board or committee procedures that the new disclosures are
stimulating. If these fundamental aspects of ASR 250 are removed, the Board
will have to reconsider its views and consider whether there are other devices
that it can recommend to achieve the same results.
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Management’s close relationship with auditors whose firms also
provide MAS might suggest to some a situation in which the auditor
and management would be too closely identified with each other. Ap
propriate disclosures, however, should allow the marketplace to work
by revealing to shareholders and directors the auditor’s relationship
with management to promote the auditor’s independence not only in
fact, but also in appearance. Whatever can be gleaned from such dis
closure, such as extraordinary management advisory services or the
absence of audit committee or board approval, will serve as impetus
for the board of directors to decide initially whether its auditor is and
will remain independent and to avoid engagements that could en
danger independence or could be so perceived. Such disclosure,
therefore, creates a self-imposed pressure on management to consider
carefully whether any particular services offered by its auditors might
impair independence or be perceived as impairing independence.
Additional information will also be produced by virtue of mem
bership in the SEC Practice Section. As a condition of membership
in the Section, SEC audit clients must receive reports from members
disclosing the total fees received from the client for MAS furnished
during the year under audit and a description of the types of services
r e n d e r e d . 134A client’s board of directors or audit committee, there
fore, receives a mandatory report on MAS provided by the company’s
auditor and can satisfy itself as to the auditor’s independence. Coupled
with the disclosures required under ASR 250, which should create
subtle pressures to scrutinize carefully all MAS engagements, this
membership requirement should also stimulate audit committees and
boards of directors to utilize these reports in evaluating MAS and its
effect on auditors’ independence.
Membership in the SEC Practice Section will also obligate mem
bers to file annually with the Section gross fees for accounting and
auditing, tax, and MAS expressed as a percentage of total gross fees.
Such information is open to public inspection.135 With these figures,
shareholders and the general investing public can review the relative
amount of nonaudit work individual auditing firms perform and assess
whether their primary service of auditing financial statements is being
diluted. If the public or boards of directors are concerned with any
such trend, they can respond by engaging audit firms that have not
chosen that course.
While the annual filing will provide additional data on the relative
importance, in terms of fees, for MAS, tax, and auditing and account
ing services, it will not reveal the relative importance of MAS to ac134. Organization Document, Section IV, 3(g)(12).
135. Organization Document, Section IV, 3(j).
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counting and auditing as furnished only to audit clients. The Board
believes that such data could be helpful to observers concerned with
this question and to the Board in any future examination of this
question. Accordingly, the Board recommends adding to the Or
ganization Document a requirement that members’ annual disclosure
statements under Section IV, 3(g) of that document include disclosure
of gross fees for both MAS and tax services performed for audit
clients, expressed as a percentage of aggregate fees charged.
The Board believes that reliance on disclosure with enhanced audit
committee or board of directors surveillance is a far better approach
than imposing prophylactic proscriptions, since individual factors and
special situations can be considered in each case. Users of financial
statements, including boards of directors and audit committees, should
be given time to evaluate the importance of the new disclosure rules
in assessing auditor independence.
Incentives for Independence

Another factor that ensures the maintenance of auditor independence
is grounded in the professional ethics of accountants. Acceptance of
responsibility to the public is one of the distinguishing features of a
profession; accountants have accepted the responsibilities placed on
them by the government, the business community, and the public at
large, all of whom rely on accountants for fair financial reporting and
professional advice on business problems. The independence of
auditors is a characteristic imposed by accountants on themselves not
only as a matter of personal professional integrity, but also as a
response to their responsibilities to their various publics. As in
dicated earlier,136 the AICPA’s Code of Professional Ethics and MAS
Professional Standards require that members be independent of their
clients by maintaining their integrity and objectivity when expressing
opinions on financial statements.137 Failure to maintain independence
is enforceable by a Trial Board that may, after a hearing, admonish,
suspend, or expel a member from the AICPA.
In addition to professional discipline, accountants may be subject
to SEC sanction, pursuant to Rule 2(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Prac
tice, if they fail to maintain an independent status.138 An auditor has
further incentives to retain his honesty and integrity when dealing
with a client, since he is faced with substantial liabilities at common
law and under the general antifraud provisions of the federal securi-

136. See pp. 26-30, supra.
137. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 101; Vol. 2, ET § 51.01.
138. See p. 29, supra.
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ties laws. Potential damages from individual and class actions pro
vide incentive to auditors to preserve carefully their independence and
to cooperate with the new disclosure provisions discussed earlier to
create adequate safeguards for the investing public.
AlCPA Peer Review Process

Mandatory peer reviews conducted within the AICPA structure pro
vide another check on the independence of auditors. The SEC Practice
Section requires its members to undergo peer review at least every
three years.139 The program, administered by the Peer Review Com
mittee of the SEC Practice Section, has several objectives, including
determining whether member firms maintain and apply quality con
trols in accordance with standards established by the AICPA Quality
Control Standards Committee and whether such firms meet member
ship requirements.140 As the reviews are structured now, emphasis is
on the quality control system of a firm’s accounting and auditing prac
tice which, of necessity, includes review of the procedures for main
taining independence with respect to audit clients.
The Board does believe, however, that the process should be ex
panded to require a more careful review of MAS engagements per
formed for audit clients. While the Board does not believe that the
peer review process should include a review of the quality control pro
cedures applied to an MAS engagement itself, it does believe that
MAS engagements should be reviewed to determine whether they
impaired the auditor’s independence in rendering an opinion on the
fairness of the client’s financial s t a t e m e n t s . 14The efficacy of such an
inquiry depends on developing some agreed upon formulation of at
tributes relative to MAS and relevant to independence. At the present,
these attributes seem generally to center on the auditor’s role in con
nection with furnishing MAS. That is, the auditor must be limited
to serving in an advisory capacity and refrain from making manage
ment decisions or participating in the conduct of operations.142 By in139. Organization Document, Section IV, 3(c).
140. Ibid., Section VIII, 3.
141. A more careful review of MAS engagements was generally supported by
witnesses at the POB Hearing. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta,
Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 30-31; N. Auerbach, Coopers & Lybrand, Tr.
92; J. Mason, Jr., The University of Alabama, Tr. 213-14; S. Klion, Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 243, 258-59; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive
Committee, Tr. 280; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 307.
142. This proposition is embodied in the present standards and has been sup
ported by many witnesses before the Board. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony:
D. Noonan, Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, Tr. 67-68; N. Auerbach, Coopers
& Lybrand, Tr. 92; T. Testman, Ernst & Ernst, Tr. 166-68; H. Moss, Altschuler,

45

vestigating these facets of MAS, peer reviewers not only may better
meet the objectives of the process, but they may also generate some
data on the interplay of MAS and independence that will enable the
Board to consider this matter at a later date with a stronger factual
basis.
Specific Services Mentioned in the Organization
Document and Proposal
As indicated above, the Board generally believes that, when possible,
questions relating to scope of services should be answered in general
terms rather than by attempting to analyze specific services and draw
ing hard, sometimes crude, lines around permissible and impermissible
MAS. Nonetheless, some discussion of the specific services mentioned
in the Organization Document and the Proposal is warranted.
Marketing Consulting, Plant Layout and Design,
Product Design and Analysis, and
Employee Benefit Consulting

The Proposal contains a discussion of the following: (1) executive
recruiting services; (2) marketing consulting services; (3) plant lay
out and design services; (4) product design and analysis; (5) insurance
actuarial services; and (6) employee benefit consulting services.
Appendices A and B of the Organization Document and Appendix
A of the Proposal discuss certain types of services under the general
rubric of marketing consulting, plant layout and design, and product
design and analysis, which are or would be permissible and certain
types which are or would be proscribed. The existing and proposed
proscriptions are predicated on the conclusion that the skills required
for performing the proscribed services are nonfinancial in nature or
are not related to accounting or auditing. Inasmuch as the Board
recommends that the skill related criterion not be imposed, it would
recommend that the specific proscriptions concerning those services
contained in the Organization Document and the Proposal be de
leted. This does not mean that the Board believes accountants
should perform architectural or engineering services, act as a general
contractor in constructing a building, or develop a new product.
But, the Board is not aware that those services and others specified
under the general subject matter under discussion are furnished by
accounting firms in any event. If such services and other similar
Melvoin and Glasser, Tr. 227; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr.
237; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 271; L. Dowell,
McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn & Company, Tr. 290.
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services are being furnished, as a result of ASR 250, that fact will be
revealed in the client’s proxy statement. If it then appears that ac
countants are engaged in services which are likely to impair their
image, further consideration of this question may be necessary.
The Board also does not believe, as a general matter, that furnish
ing marketing consulting, plant layout, and product design and
analysis services will impair an accountant’s independence if per
formed in a manner consistent with existing MAS Professional
Standards and the Code of Professional Ethics relating to independ
ence.143 Notwithstanding the above, the Board recognizes that this
is a very broad area, and it is possible that under some circumstances
independence could be impaired. To attempt to identify in the ab
stract what those circumstances might be, however, would be an
exercise in futility. The Board, therefore, subscribes to the Com
mission’s early advice that “the question of independence is one of
fact, to be determined in the light of all the pertinent circumstances
in a particular case.”144
The question of independence is raised in the Proposal with re
spect to employee benefit consulting, and general guidelines are
established which are largely duplicative of existing MAS Professional
Standards and the Code of Professional Ethics.145
As with the services discussed above, the Board does not believe
143. See notes and 145 and 159, infra.
144. Accounting Series Release No. 47 (January 25, 1944). This leaves open
the question of who is to do the determining. Obviously the auditor has the
duty to make the initial determination. So do the client’s management and its
board of directors or audit committee— a duty which will be more apparent and
no doubt be taken more seriously as a result of the disclosure occasioned by
ASR 250. The SEC no doubt will continue to do the determining on cases
brought to its attention. If the recommendations in this report are adopted, the
determination will also be made in the course of peer reviews.
145. For example, paragraph (1) under the discussion of Employee Benefit
Consulting in the Proposal (see Addendum B hereto) would provide that the
member not assume managerial functions or the client’s responsibility for judg
ments in several areas. See AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS
§§ 110.04, 410.02, and 430 for the same limitation.
Paragraph (2) provides that, while services may be on a recurring or periodic
basis, they should not require continuous involvement and therefore become an
engagement to perform a management function. This limitation is related to the
prior one and is probably covered by the MAS Practice Standards cited above.
In addition the Code of Ethics prohibits members who audit clients from de
veloping any relationship with the client in which the member is virtually a part
of management. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52.10.
Paragraph (3) requires that the member take precautions to assume that the
client understands the recommendation so that it makes informed judgments.
This requirement naturally follows from the others. If the client is expected to
make all significant decisions based on the accountant’s advice, the accountant
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that furnishing employee benefit consulting services, as a general
rule, would impair an accountant’s independence.146 Again, it is
necessary to look at the facts and circumstances of each case and a
broad injunction or permissive conclusion is inappropriate.
Actuarial Services

The furnishing of actuarial services, either to insurance companies
or employee benefit plans, raises special questions which have been
addressed by both sides, perhaps more completely than any other
particular s e r v i c e . 147The Board believes that the only serious ques
tion is whether an accounting firm can furnish actuarial services to
an audit client or regarding an audit client’s employee benefit plan
without impairing its independence to render an opinion on the
financial statements of the client or the client’s employee benefit plan.
Accordingly, the Board is satisfied that there are no problems asso
ciated with an accounting firm furnishing actuarial services to a
nonaudit client. The question narrows down to whether an account
ing firm should audit the financial statements of (1) an insurance
company for which it also furnished actuarial services; (2) a client
for which it acted as the enrolled actuary of the client’s employee
must be satisfied that his advice is not de facto decision making. See also,
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 430.22.
Paragraph (4) sets forth seven specific matters which would otherwise be
prohibited because (1) they would associate the accountant too closely with
management (maintenance of original records, custodian of securities, claim
administration, and negotiating plan terms); (2) they would require making final
decisions rather than rendering advice and might otherwise be prohibited by
ERISA’s prohibited transaction sections (acting as investment advisor or some
other fiduciary capacity); (3) are already expressly prohibited by the Code of
Ethics, AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 302.01 (contingent fees).
146. Actuarial services furnished to employee plans are discussed separately
below.
147. See POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 10;
R. Keating, A. S. Hansen, Inc., Tr. 94; E. Boynton, American Academy of
Actuaries, Tr. 104; C. Watson, Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice, Tr.
125-28, 134. Letters in response to the Notice from: American Academy of
Actuaries, August 14, 1978; A.S. Hansen, August 1, 1978, incorporating state
ment to SEC, November 30, 1977; Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice,
August 11, 1978; Coopers & Lybrand, August 10, 1978. Response to Securities
Act Release No. 5869: A.S. Hansen, Inc.; American Academy of Actuaries;
Coopers & Lybrand; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; George B. Buck, Consult
ing Actuaries, Inc.
See also W. Dreher & C. Graese, “The Compatibility of Actuarial Consulting
and Auditing Services,” supra note 4; B. Hazlehurst, “Auditor/Actuary Rela
tions Under ERISA: As an Actuary Sees It,” supra note 4; T. Kelley and
D. Roscetti, “Auditor/Actuary Relations Under ERISA: From the Auditor’s
Standpoint,” supra note 4.
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benefit plan; or (3) an employee benefit plan for which it also acted
as the enrolled actuary.
Before discussing the foregoing question, the Board notes that it
believes accounting firms should not be discouraged in developing
their understanding of the actuarial science. A better understanding
would seem to lead to more reliable audits where actuarial deter
minations are an important part of a client’s financial statements.148
Moreover, the Board is concerned that restricting the type of actu
arial services an accounting firm can furnish to audit clients may
restrict the overall level of actuarial activity of the firms and therefore
limit the breadth of its skills. Among other things, the more re
stricted the actuarial practice of the firm, the less likely it will be
able to attract the most qualified actuarial personnel to its pro
fessional ranks.149
Two separate but related arguments are advanced to support the
notion that an accounting firm would not be independent to render
an opinion on a client’s financial statements if it also served as an
actuary for that client or for an employee benefit plan sponsored by
that client. These arguments relate to the possibility that (1) the
dual services will result in self-review;150 and (2) the actuary will
not limit his role to providing advice and technical assistance. Since
one of the purposes to be achieved by the role limitation is the
avoidance of self-review, these arguments are related. Another
purpose for a role limitation is to avoid appearing essentially as
part of management’s team.
The question of self-review is sometimes addressed in the context
of Statement of Auditing Standards No. 11 (“SAS 11”). SAS 11
generally provides that an auditor obtain an understanding of the
methods and assumptions used by a specialist, and need not perform
comprehensive audit procedures or challenge the specialist’s methods
or assumptions, unless his limited review procedures lead him to
believe that the findings are unreasonable under the circumstances.151
In the context of using the work of an actuary, an accountant, relying
on SAS 11, must satisfy himself as to the professional qualifications
and reputation of the actuary, understand the actuary’s methods and
assumptions, and test the data supplied by management to the actuary;
148. POB Hearing Testimony: N. Auerbach, Coopers &. Lybrand, Tr. 82; J.
Seitz, Touche Ross & Co., Tr. 197-99.
149. POB Hearing Testimony: J. Seitz, Touche Ross & Co., Tr. 195; J. Bur
ton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 306, 310.
150. See, e.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co.,
Tr. 10; R. Keating, A. S. Hansen, Inc., Tr. 94-102; E. Boynton, American Acad
emy of Actuaries, Tr. 104-07.
151. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, AU § 336.08.
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the accountant performing the audit does not duplicate the actuary’s
work.
Insofar as an auditor must satisfy himself on the professional quali
fications and reputation of the actuary, that judgment has obviously
been made at the time the auditing firm agreed to hire its actuarial
personnel and in all likelihood after much greater analysis and review
of both objective and subjective criteria relating to the actuarial
personnel than would be the case when evaluating third-party actu
aries. It is unrealistic, therefore, to suggest that such a judgment can
be better made by a stranger than an associate, partner, or employee
of the auditor.152 Similarly, the Board does not believe it is objection
able that an auditor tests the validity of client supplied data relied
upon by the actuarial personnel of his firm. The Board understands
that actuaries ordinarily do not test the validity of data supplied by
management, at least not in any audit sense. Accordingly, the testing
of that data often is done for the first time by the auditing firm,
whether or not the actuarial work is performed by an actuary asso
ciated with the auditing firm. In any event, even if the actuarial
personnel tested such information, the Board believes that the auditing
personnel would not be relieved from performing audit procedures to
the same extent they would be performed if the actuary were not
associated with the auditing firm. If this is not clear from existing
auditing standards, SAS 11 should be clarified to so provide. Inas
much as SAS 11 requires an auditor to understand an actuary’s
methods and assumptions and to believe that the actuary’s conclusions
are not unreasonable, there may be some credence to the argument
that acting both as actuary and auditor for the same client can result
in some self-review. This does not mean, however, that the limited
self-review involved impairs the auditor’s independence or otherwise
is harmful to the public or investors. First of all, it must be remem152. Critics, of course, may argue that once the initial hiring decision is made
subsequent evaluation of the qualifications of a fellow employee or partner
cannot be performed objectively. This is a problem not only with respect to
MAS personnel but with respect to all personnel, including those on the audit
staff. Accounting firms generally have overcome this by installing quality control
procedures which require, among other things, periodic evaluation of hiring and
promotion practices and compliance with the firms’ own continuing professional
education requirements. The professional staff (including MAS personnel) of
member firms of the SEC Practice Section are now required to adhere to pre
scribed continuing professional education standards and the mandatory peer
review must check for compliance. The Board believes that these safeguards
overcome any serious concern that an accounting firm can not fairly evaluate the
qualifications of its own employees. Additional safeguards would exist if the
peer review were expanded to cover hiring practices with respect to MAS
professional staff, but the Board is not prepared to suggest that this is essential.
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bered that the review is quite limited and is not duplicative of the
work performed by an actuary.
Perhaps more important from the public’s standpoint is not the
potential for self-review but the objectivity of the person performing
actuarial services in the first place. The Board understands that it is
not uncommon for insurance companies to rely exclusively on their
own staff for actuarial expertise. While an auditor auditing financial
statements of such a client would, under SAS 11, be required to
employ more thorough procedures with respect to the actuary’s
methods, assumptions, or findings (or engage an outside specialist
for that purpose) than if the actuary were independent of management,
he would not be required to duplicate the actuarial work performed.153
In the Board’s view, the use of a nonmanagement or nonemployee
actuary in the first instance provides at least as much protection. In
light of the very limited review an auditor is required to perform
with respect to the findings of an actuary who is not related to man
agement, little, if anything, is gained by requiring the actuary to be
independent of the auditor. Because the Board perceives some po
tential benefit to the quality of audits by allowing auditors to have
in-house actuarial expertise, it does not believe the Executive Com
mittee should adopt scope of services limitations which would dis
courage that result by prohibiting the firm from furnishing actuarial
services to audit clients.
Some persons have argued that an actuary cannot satisfy the
requirement imposed by the AICPA’s MAS Professional Standards
that, in performing MAS, an accountant must limit his role to advisor
and not make management decisions.1
54 Since the role limitation
relates to independence155 and the Board recommends that com
pliance with those portions of the MAS Practice Standards and the
AICPA’s Professional Code of Ethics relating to independence be
made a condition of membership in the SEC Practice Section, this
argument must be addressed.
The ability of an actuary to appropriately limit his role was most
vigorously challenged with respect to acting as an enrolled actuary
of an employee benefit plan. These challenges are prompted by Sub
sections 103(a) and (d) of ERISA, which require that an actuarial
statement be filed as part of a pension plan’s annual report and that
the actuarial statement include an opinion of an “enrolled actuary,”
as defined. Specifically, Section 103(a)(4)(B ) provides as follows:
(B)

The enrolled actuary shall utilize such assumptions and techniques

153. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, AU § 336.08.
154. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS §§ 110.04, 410.01, 430.
155. Ibid., MS §410.01.
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as are necessary to enable him to form an opinion as to whether the
contents of the matters reported . . .
(i) are in the aggregate reasonably related to the experience of the
plan and to reasonable expectations; and
(ii) represent his best estimate of anticipated experience under the
plan.156
Inasmuch as Subsection 103(a)(4)(B) requires the enrolled actuary
to formulate his own best estimate of anticipated experience under
the plan, it is difficult to maintain that an actuary acting in that
capacity is simply giving advice. On the other hand, it is equally
difficult to conclude that the actuary has usurped management’s role
and is making management decisions. Rather, it appears to the Board
that, in the context of an employee benefit plan, the enrolled actuary
is simply performing an independent professional service outside of
management’s traditional area of operation and expertise. It is not,
therefore, making management decisions and should not be viewed
as being part of management’s team. Accordingly, the Board does
not believe that an accounting firm exceeds the role limitation men
tioned above or otherwise impairs its independence as an auditor
simply because it serves as enrolled actuary of an employee benefit
plan and audits that plan or that plan’s sponsor.1
57
156. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 103(a)(4)(B)
[emphasis added]. See also Section 412(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
which, in pertinent part, provides:
(3) For purposes of this section [determination of funding policy], all costs,
liabilities, rates of interest, and other factors under the plan shall be determined
on the basis of actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are
reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expecta
tions) and which, in combination, offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated
experience under the plan [emphasis added].
157. This is consistent with the conclusion reached by the Department of
Labor in an interpretive bulletin addressing the question of independence in the
context of Section 103(a)(3)(A) of ERISA. That section requires that the ac
countant rendering an opinion on the Plan’s financial statements to be contained
in the annual report be independent. In pertinent part, the interpretation pro
vides as follows:
An independent qualified public accountant may permissably engage in or have
members of his or her firm engage in certain activities which will not have the
effect of removing recognition of his or her independence. For example, . . . the
rendering of services by an actuary associated with an accountant or accounting
firm shall not impair the accountant’s or the accounting firm’s independence.
Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 75-1, 29 CFR § 2509-75-9.
Notwithstanding the foregoing interpretation, some commentators dispute
that it is intended to permit an accounting firm to perform original actuarial
services unless it expressly relies on the actuarial determinations when issuing
its opinion on the financial statements. See, e.g., Response to Securities Act
Release No. 5869 from American Academy of Actuaries, dated April 11, 1978.

52

In examining the role limitation as applied to an insurance com
pany actuary, more traditional analysis should be employed. Actuarial
considerations for an insurance company are integrally related to the
role and responsibility of management. Thus, if an accounting firm
furnishes actuarial services to management of an insurance company
audit client, care must be taken to satisfy the role requirements con
tained in the AICPA’s MAS Professional Standards. This means gen
erally that the actuary must only furnish advice to management and
render assistance and that management must make the final decision.
To do this, the accountant must be satisfied that the client has the
expertise to understand the significance of his recommendations so
that all of the significant matters of judgment involved are determined
or approved by the client and the client is in a position to have an
informed judgment on the r e s u l t s . 158The Board does not believe that
this standard can reasonably be met if an auditing firm is doing more
than rendering supplementary actuarial advice.
On balance, therefore, the Board does not believe that an account
ing firm should be prohibited from serving both as auditor and enrolled
actuary for an employee benefit plan or from serving as auditor for
a client and as enrolled actuary for that client’s employee benefit
plans. When furnishing actuarial services to insurance company audit
clients, care must be taken to limit those services to advice and tech
nical assistance. To avoid the appearance of exceeding the limits of
such an advisory role, accounting firms should not furnish actuarial
services to insurance companies unless such services are supplemental
to primary actuarial advice furnished by another actuary not associated
with the accounting firm.
Executive Recruitment

The final area of discussion relates to executive recruiting services.
The Executive Committee has added an Appendix B to the Organiza
tion Document to prohibit members of the SEC Practice Section from
searching for prospective candidates for managerial, executive, or
director positions with its audit clients. The limitation, however, does
not prohibit an accountant from giving a client the name of prospective
candidates (including employees of the accounting firm) and it does not
prohibit an accountant, on the request of a client, from interviewing
candidates for financial, accounting, administrative, or control posi
tions and advising the client on the candidates’ competence in those
areas.

158. See note 99, supra.
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In addition to the foregoing, the amendment prohibits an account
ing firm from engaging in psychological testing or other formal
evaluation programs or from undertaking reference checks for candi
dates for executive or director positions on behalf of a client. Finally,
accountants are forbidden to act as negotiators on an audit client’s
behalf in determining such things as title, compensation, and other
conditions of employment.
The Board accepts the Executive Committee’s decision in this
area. At a minimum, engaging in active recruiting services creates
an appearance of an independence problem. And, there appear to be
little, if any, audit benefits derived from furnishing such services. The
one benefit the Board does see is the interjection in the interview and
evaluation process of an accountant’s expertise in accounting and
financial controls. It would, in the Board’s view, be a mistake to deny
management the views of its independent accountants concerning the
competency of a candidate for accounting or other financial positions.
This benefit is preserved in the amendment and permits members of
the SEC Practice Section to interview candidates and evaluate their
competence in financial, accounting, administrative, or control posi
tions.
The Board also believes it is important to note that recruiting
services, as such, are available from other sources. Thus, the restric
tion will not result in depriving audit clients of valuable and necessary
services. Because the restricted services would, if furnished, create
an appearance of impairment of independence, and because pro
hibiting such services will neither deny the public any audit benefits
nor deprive the client of a necessary service unavailable from other
responsible sources, the Board concurs in the Executive Committee’s
decision.
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Summation
In general, the Board has concluded that maintenance of independ
ence should be the only limitation on scope of services and that in
dependence be assessed after giving consideration to potential benefits
derived from furnishing various services and recognizing that in
tegrity and risk of civil liability and administrative sanctions can
offset some loss of objectivity. To implement this general conclusion
the Board recommends reliance on existing programs and procedures
and suggests that adherence to the portions of the existing MAS
Professional Standards and the Code of Professional Ethics dealing
with independence be made a condition of membership in the SEC
Practice Section.159 As indicated in the body of this report, however,
the Board believes the Executive Committee decision of July 26, 1978,
to restrict certain executive recruiting services can be supported and
should not now be disturbed.
In formulating its conclusions and recommendations the Board has
considered the various conflicting views and the arguments pressed
in their support. It is evident that there is no formula to accommodate
all the views and interests involved, and the Board recognizes that
those whose views are contrary to the conclusions reached here are
not likely to be convinced.
However, the Board believes that its conclusions are sound and
that the Executive Committee in its Proposals was starting down a
road that could lead only to an administrative quagmire. A program
of making authoritive ad hoc determinations, on either hypothetical
or actual cases, of which services do and which do not involve
auditing and accounting skills can only lead to confusion, frustration,
and inequity. On the other hand, such radical surgery as the Senate
Report suggests, that is to say banning all MAS, save tax and internal
control advice and assistance, while clear and simple, seems far more
159. Aside from the general admonition appearing throughout the MAS
Professional Standards and the Code of Professional Ethics concerning inde
pendence, other pronouncements impose the following limitations: (1) members
must avoid assuming the role of management and limit their role generally to
that of providing technical assistance and advice (MS §§ 110.04, 410.01, and
430 and ET §§ 191.109-.110); (2) members must not become involved in any
relationship with management that causes them to become virtually a part of
management or under management’s control (MS § 410.09 and ET § 52.10);
and (3) members may not charge contingent fees for their services (ET § 302.01).
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draconian than the record justifies. Nevertheless, there is enough
concern about the scope of services in responsible quarters so that
the question cannot be dismissed as a “nonproblem.” The Board
believes that there is potential danger to the public interest and to
the profession in the unlimited expansion of MAS to audit clients,
and some moderating principles and procedures are needed.
These principles lie in the established axiom that auditors must
maintain independence, plus the corollary that the role of auditors
in providing MAS, if beyond advice and technical assistance, may
destroy independence or appear to do so to a significant degree. The
appropriate procedure lies in the peer review process and the dis
closures occasioned by ASR 250 and the SEC Practice Section, all
of which are new, and in reliance on audit committee or Board of
Director- surveillance. The Board has therefore concluded that the
SEC Practice Section should reassert the principles of independence
and of role as an advisor as they relate to MAS, revise the peer review
procedures to search for adherence to these principles, and observe
the effects of the new disclosures and the information they will provide.
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ADDENDUM A

Organizational Structure and Functions
of the SEC Practice Section of the
AlCPA Division for CPA Firms*
Section IV. Membership
3. Requirements of Members
Member firms shall be obligated to abide by the following:
(a) Ensure that a majority of members of the firm are CPAs, that the
firm can legally engage in the practice of public accounting, and
that each proprietor, shareholder, or partner of the firm resident
in the United States and eligible for the AICPA membership is a
member of the AICPA.
(b) Adhere to quality control standards established by the AICPA
Quality Control Standards Committee.
(c) Submit to peer reviews of the firm’s accounting and audit practice
every three years or at such additional times as designated by the
executive committee, the reviews to be conducted in accordance
with review standards established by the section’s peer review
committee.
(d) Ensure that all professionals in the firm resident in the United
States, including CPAs and non-CPAs, participate in at least one
hundred twenty hours of continuing professional education over
three years, but in not less than twenty hours in any given year.
(e) Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of each SEC engage
ment which has had another audit partner-in-charge for a period
of five consecutive years and prohibit such incumbent partner from
returning to in-charge status on the engagement for a minimum
of two years except as follows;
(1) This requirement shall not become effective until two years
after a firm becomes a member.
(2) In unusual circumstances, the chief executive partner of a
firm or his designee may grant no more than one two-year
extension so long as there is an in-depth supplemental review
by another partner, or
(3) An application for relief is granted by the peer review com
mittee on the basis of unusual hardships.
(f) Ensure that a concurring review of the audit report by a partner
other than the audit partner in charge of an SEC engagement is
required before issuance of an audit report on the financial state* This excerpt is reprinted from AICPA, Division for CPA Firms SEC Practice Sec
tion, Peer Review Manual (1978).
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ments of an SEC registrant. The peer review committee may
authorize alternative procedures where this requirement cannot be
met because of the size of the member firm.
(g) File with the section for each fiscal year of the United States firm
(covering offices maintained in the United States and its territories)
the following information to be open to public inspection:
(1) Form of business entity (e.g., partnership or corporation) and
identification of domestic affiliates rendering services to clients.
(2) Description or chart of internal organizational structure and
international organization (including the nature of relation
ships maintained in each geographic region).
(3) Number and location of offices.
(4) Total number of partners and non-CPAs with parallel status
within the firm’s organizational structure.
(5) Total number of CPAs (including partners).
(6) Total number of professional staff (including partners).
(7) Total number of personnel (including item 6, above).
(8) Number and names of SEC clients for which the firm is princi
pal auditor-of-record and any changes of such clients.
(9) Number of SEC audit clients each of whose total domestic
fees exceed 5 percent of total domestic firm fees and the
percentage which each of these clients’ fees represent to total
domestic firm fees.
(10) A statement indicating that the firm has complied with AICPA
and SEC independence requirements.
(11) Disclosure regarding pending litigation as required under
generally accepted accounting principles and indicating wheth
er such pending litigation is expected to have a material
effect on the firm’s financial condition or its ability to serve
clients.
(12) Gross fees for accounting and auditing, tax, and MAS ex
pressed as a percentage of total gross fees.
(h) Maintain such minimum amounts and types of accountants’ liabil
ity insurance as shall be prescribed from time to time by the
executive committee.
(0 When determining its scope of management advisory services,
place primary emphasis on accounting and financial related areas*
* These areas would include the design and installation of systems (such as computerbased systems and procedures) and the performance of studies related to the account
ing, general record-keeping, and control. This process relates to recording, compiling,
analyzing, and communicating financial and economic information, expressed in
money or other qualities. This process involves and provides support to the essential
organizational functions, such as (1) sales and distribution of products or services;
(2) protection and custody of assets; (3) procurement and use of raw materials,
capital, and human resources; and (4) production of products or services. These
complex functions are closely interrelated in an integrated system. The specific ele
ments of the overall system interact with each other in many ways and at many levels
of the organization. The process also embraces systems for planning and budgeting,
including comparisons between planned results and actual results.
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and refrain from performing management advisory services engage
ments for audit clients whose securities are registered with the SEC
that—
(1) Would create a loss of the firm’s independence for the purpose
of expressing opinions on financial statements of such clients.
(2) Are predominantly commercial in character and inconsistent
with the firm’s professional status as certified public account
ants.
(3) Are inconsistent with the firm’s responsibilities to the public.
(4) Consist of the following types of services:
(i) Psychological testing
(ii) Public opinion polls
(iii) Merger and acquisition assistance for a finder’s fee
(5) Will be proscribed by the executive committee after further
study and which comprise portions of what is included under
the broad classifications of marketing consulting and plant layout
as tentatively outlined in Appendix A.
(6) May be proscribed by the executive committee from time to
time after further study based on the concepts described above
in Appendix A. (See resolution of executive committee, Ap
pendix B.)
(j) Report annually to the audit committee or board of directors (or
its equivalent in a partnership) of each SEC audit client on the
total fees received from the client for management advisory services
during the year under audit and a description of the types of
such services rendered.
(k) Report to the audit committee or board of directors (or its equiva
lent in a partnership) of each SEC audit client on the nature of
disagreements with the management of the client on financial
accounting and reporting matters and auditing procedures which,
if not satisfactorily resolved, would have caused the issuance of a
qualified opinion on the client’s financial statements.
(0 Pay dues as established by the executive committee and comply
with the rules and regulations of the section as established from
time to time by the executive committee and with the decisions
of the executive committee in respect to matters within its compe
tence; cooperate with the peer review committee in connection with
its duties, including disciplinary proceedings; and comply with any
sanction which may be imposed by the executive committee.
Appendix A— SEC Practice Section Organization
The impact on the audit independence of CPA firms of performing
management advisory services for audit clients has been carefully studied
many times in the past, most recently by the Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities. In no case have the studies identified instances where the
auditor’s independence was in fact impaired by the performance of manage
ment advisory services.
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Nevertheless, concerns continue to be expressed by lay observers of the
profession. It may be that the perception of these observers would be
altered if they had a better understanding of the role of CPAs in providing
management advisory services. However, it is virtually impossible to
communicate this understanding to the public at large, and it is expected
that there will be a continuing belief by lay observers that auditors should
refrain from performing certain types of consulting services for audit
clients.
Because the image and perception of CPAs as being independent of
their audit clients is vital to public reliance on their opinions on financial
statements, it is intended that the executive committee of the SEC practice
section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms may from time to time
proscribe certain types of management advisory services based upon
further studies and experience. As a general guideline, services which are
related to accounting and financial matters will not be proscribed. Those
which do not fall within this broad definition or are only remotely related
will be the subject of continuing consideration for prohibition.
Examples of two types of services to be initially considered and the
portions which may be proscribed are as follows;
Marketing Consulting
Marketing consulting services rendered to audit clients are limited to those
which are significantly financial or internal control oriented in nature and
respond to their needs for objective external insight, study, and evaluation.
These are engagements that CPAs as a professional group are best qualified
to perform.
Engagements of this type fall into two broad classes: (1) those where
marketing activities are but one segment of a broader study, such as—
1. Operations or management audits of one or more business units or
multiple functions of them.
2. Profitability studies of business units.
3. Review and reporting on prospective (forecast) results and the conduct
of financial feasibility studies.
4. Services to improve existing business management systems, procedures,
and practices (e.g., the development of management information/control systems).
and (2) those where only marketing activities are under review, such as—
1. The study of financial and administrative controls applied to marketing
activities, the operating consequences that result therefrom, and the
cost-benefits that could accrue from modification of either.
2. Analysis of the internal and external marketing factors (e.g., price-cost
relationships, product mix, competitive factors, industry and customer
demand experience and outlook, and business constraints) in evaluating
the potential change in profitability from various operating alternatives
available for an existing product/service, business unit, or select
elements thereof.
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3. Services similar to the foregoing with respect to an expanded or new
product line, service, or facility (such as an addition to a hospital).
4. Services to improve existing marketing management systems, proce
dures, and practices to improve financial or administrative control
and competitive posture (marketing information systems).
The CPA should not render those types of marketing consulting services
which are essentially nonfinancial in nature and where financial or internal
control implications are remote or only indirectly involved. These poten
tial services are multiple and include such activities as—
1. Purely subjective evaluations of any type, including the development
and evaluations of attitude surveys of user/consumer/influence groups.
2. Development and conduct of market test activities.
3. Product design, engineering, and development of physical specifica
tions.
4. Product quality control policy, specifications, and testing programs.
5. Development of advertising copy, media strategy, and time/space
buying plans.
6. Development/evaluation of sales literature, aids, presentations, con
tracts, and so forth, to be utilized in the selling situation.
7. Package design and engineering.
8. Technical evaluation of physical/usage characteristics of competing
products.
9. Development or evaluation of product safety policy, standards, and
so forth.
Plant Layout
In the broadest sense, plant layout includes the total design of a manufac
turing or processing facility.
Such services as product design, site selection, and actual design and
construction of productive facilities of manufacturing companies should
not be performed by CPAs.
To the extent that the activity involves such areas as (1) determining the
selection, control, and flow of costs of production (i.e., material labor),
(2) the financial feasibility of new, expanded, or modified product manu
facture, (3) the optimum controls and positioning of raw material, inprocess, and finished goods inventory, and (4) clerical layout and staffing,
the performance of professional service falls within the financial and
accounting expertise of CPAs.
Other Services
Other services may be proscribed from time to time by the executive
committee after further study of such types of services as executive search
and actuarial evaluation based upon concepts described herein and in the
accompanying document.
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Appendix B— Resolution
WHEREAS, section IV 3(0(6) of the “Organizational Structure and Func
tions of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for Firms”
(organizational document) authorizes the executive committee to proscribe
certain services which may be performed by member firms of this section
for audit clients whose securities are registered with the SEC; and
WHEREAS, the executive committee, after further study and advice,
believes that the action to be taken herein is consistent with the concepts
expressed in section IV 3(0, as presently in effect, and with Appendix A
of the organizational document;
IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, as follows:
Executive Recruiting Services
The hiring of persons for managerial, executive, or director positions is
a function which is properly the client’s* responsibility. Accordingly, the
role of the CPA firm in this function should be limited. The CPA firm
should not—
1. Accept an engagement to search for, or seek out, prospective candi
dates for managerial, executive, or director positions with its audit
clients. This would not preclude giving an audit client the name
of a prospective candidate previously known to someone in the CPA
firm.
2. Engage in psychological testing, other formal testing or evaluation
programs, or undertake reference checks of prospective candidates for
an executive or director position on behalf of an audit client.
3. Act as a negotiator on the audit client’s behalf, for example, in deter
mining position status or title, compensation, fringe benefits, or other
conditions of employment.
4. Recommend, or advise an audit client to hire, a specific candidate
for a specific job. However, a CPA firm may, upon request by the
audit client, interview candidates and advise the client on the candi
date’s competence for financial, accounting, administrative or control
positions.
When an audit client seeks to fill a position within its organization which
is related to its system of accounting, financial, or administrative controls,
the client will frequently approach employees of the CPA firm directly as
candidates or seek referral of the CPA firm’s employees who may be
considering employment outside of the profession. Such employment from
time to time is an inevitable consequence of the training and experience
which the public accounting profession provides to its staff, is beneficial
to all concerned, including society in general, and therefore is not pro
scribed.
* The term “client” refers to a company whose securities are registered with the SEC.
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ADDENDUM B

Proposed Amendments
Proposed Amendment to Section IV, 3(f) of the
Organizational Structure and Functions of the SEC
Practice Section of the AlCPA Division for Firms
(To Replace Previous Section IV, 3(0)

(0 When determining the scope of its services, not undertake an engage
ment for its audit clients registered with the SEC where—
(1) The circumstances of that engagement impair the firm’s indepen
dence for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the financial
statements of such clients; or
(2) The skills required are not related to accounting or auditing.
From time to time, the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section
may issue interpretations to assist firms in applying these two criteria to
their practice. The committee’s current interpretations are detailed in the
appendix.
Proposed Amendment to Appendix of the
Organizational Structure and Functions of the SEC
Practice Section of the AlCPA Division for Firms
(To Replace Previous Appendix)

All professionals acknowledge that they have a dual responsibility for
their work—a direct obligation to their clients as well as broader public
responsibilities. In 1967, Roy and MacNeill, in their study, Horizons for
a Profession, observed that the public accounting profession could be
distinguished from the other professions by the degree to which it has
recognized its responsibilities to the public. The events of the last ten
years have accentuated the public accounting profession’s unique public
responsibilities.
CPA firms have an obligation to conduct their practice in such a way
as to maintain the public’s confidence in the public accounting profession.
The firms which join the SEC Practice Section agree to perform only those
services which are compatible with their responsibilities to the public. To
achieve this objective, when determining the scope of its services, a member
CPA firm will not undertake any engagement for its audit clients registered
with the SEC where—
(1) The circumstances of that engagement impair the firm’s independence
for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the financial statements
of such clients; or
(2) The skills required are not related to accounting or auditing.
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This appendix has been prepared to help the firms apply these two
criteria to specific situations in their practice. The following section defines
the key phrases used in the criteria. The next section provides some sugges
tions a firm might follow in implementing these criteria in its practice. The
final section illustrates how these criteria might be applied to some selected
services.
Definition of Key Phrases
Firms and Clients

Throughout this appendix the terms “firm” and “client” are used. In each
instance “firm” refers to a CPA firm which is a member of the AICPA
Division for Firms, SEC Practice Section. “Client” refers to a company
whose securities are registered with the SEC and which is an audit client of
the member firm in question.
Independence

Independence is the cornerstone of the public accounting profession. It
is the principal characteristic which distinguishes the public accountant
from his peers in industry or the other professions. That critical distinction
is vital to the public’s acceptance of the public accountant’s opinion. The
public acknowledges the value of the CPA’s opinion, not only because
of his tested skills but also because of his independence.
Independence is the ability to act with integrity and objectivity. Integ
rity is a quality of character. Objectivity is an attitude of mind. Because
of the nature of these traits and the difficulty of establishing their existence
in a tangible way, the appearance of independence as well as independence
in fact becomes important, particularly as it relates to the audit of publicly
held companies.
For this reason the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics prohibits the
expression of an opinion when relationships exist which pose a threat to
a CPA’s independence, either in fact or in appearance. These relationships
fall into two categories:
(1) certain financial relationships with audit clients
(2) where the CPA is virtually part of management or an employee under
management’s control.
In determining which relationships pose a threat to a CPA’s indepen
dence, in fact or in appearance, the profession uses the criterion of whether
reasonable men, having knowledge of all the facts and taking into consider
ation normal strength of character and normal behavior under the circum
stances, would conclude that a specified relationship between a CPA and a
client poses an unacceptable threat to the CPA’s integrity or objectivity.
Generally, a CPA firm’s services do not create financial interests in
clients other than through compensation for services rendered. However,
the amount of such fees should not be contingent upon the outcome or re
sults of the service. More often, any question concerning the possible loss
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of independence as a result of professional services relates to the role
or degree of involvement of the firm in the client’s affairs. The CPA firm
must avoid any engagement where it assumes management’s responsibilities
for decisions or operations of the client, either directly or through becom
ing so extensively involved in assisting management that it appears to be
a part of the client’s management team.
Because of their special interest in publicly held companies, the CPA
firms which join the SEC Practice Section have a special responsibility to
maintain the appearance as well as the fact of independence in their rela
tionships with these clients.
Skills Related to Accounting

Accounting is a discipline which provides financial and other information
essential to the efficient conduct and evaluation of the activities of any
organization.
The information which accounting provides is essential for—
(1) effective planning, control and decision making by management
(2) discharging the accountability of organizations to investors, creditors,
government agencies, taxing authorities, association members, contrib
utors to welfare institutions, and others.
Accounting includes the development and analysis of data, the testing
of their validity and relevance, and the interpretation and communication
of the resulting information to intended users. The data may be expressed
in monetary or other quantitative terms, or in symbolic or verbal forms.
Some of the data with which accounting is concerned are not precisely
measurable, but necessarily involve assumptions and estimates as to the
present effect of future events and other uncertainties. Accordingly, ac
counting requires not only technical knowledge and skill, but even more
importantly, disciplined judgment, perception and objectivity.
Accounting deals with the information needs of all organizational func
tions of a company including, for example, the—
(1) procurement and use of raw materials, capital and human resources,
(2) production of products or services, and
(3) sales and distribution of products or services.
It serves as the common language for management as they carry out
both their custodial and managerial responsibilities.
To evaluate the accounting for economic transactions, the CPA firm
must understand the systems which provide the economic data, the essen
tial functions of an organization as well as the essential processes of general
management. Consequently the “skills and disciplines related to account
ing” go beyond a knowledge of elementary accounting techniques. The
pressures to supplement basic accounting skills with varied disciplines are
a natural outgrowth of the desire to make the accounting process more
effective in an economy which involves intricate business transactions,
highly developed capital raising techniques, elaborate entity structures, the
use of sophisticated management science techniques and computer capabili
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ties, and extensive government regulation. In short, the CPA firm cannot
evaluate the accounting for an economic transaction if it does not under
stand it.
Skills Related to Auditing

The skills related to auditing are those which assist the auditor to evaluate
a client’s reported accountabilities and transactions, as well as those
which assist the auditor to evaluate the effective functioning of the under
lying systems of internal control. Put another way, the effectiveness of the
attest function of a CPA firm depends on the availability of the skills
needed to ascertain the facts and to assess the measurement and reporting
judgments involved.
Basic audit competence requires an understanding of the client’s business
—its purpose, organization and systems, the inherent risks in the industry
and in the particular company, and how all these factors interact. The
complexity of business has been increasing in all aspects. At the same time,
the public has been demanding that the auditing profession continually
improve its ability to evaluate management’s representations and to detect
errors, omissions, and improprieties. Auditors are also being urged to
broaden the scope of their involvement, e.g., by becoming associated with
unaudited financial data and “soft” information such as forecasts and
current value estimates. All of these factors require that auditors continue
to broaden as well as sharpen their skills. Participation by auditors in
advisory services helps achieve this objective.
In order to make competent judgments in auditing, the auditor may
require the assistance of those whose knowledge and experience is in
disciplines beyond the technical training of the skilled accountant. Some
CPA firms fill this need through the use of outside specialists. Other
firms find it more satisfactory to hire such specialists on a full time basis.
In either event the work of the specialist is an important element in fulfilling
the audit function.

Implementation of the Scope of
Services Criteria in a Firm’s Practice
(1) An Independence Policy

A CPA firm is expected to maintain its independence from its clients,
giving careful consideration to all factors which might impinge on its
independence. A firm will consider, for example, the impact of financial
interests, personal relationships and performance of non-audit services.
Each firm has an obligation to establish appropriate policies and to main
tain an internal control system which evaluates the engagements to be sure
that the firm’s independence is not compromised. The Peer Review, con
ducted under the auspices of the SEC Practice Section, will evaluate the
firm’s policy statement, and the effectiveness of its internal review mechan
ism.
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(2) Board of Directors or Audit Committee Involvement

The CPA firm has the primary responsibility for maintaining an independ
ent client relationship. Nonetheless, the client’s board of directors or its
audit committee shares in that responsibility. In fact, the oversight pro
vided by the board or an effective audit committee will help to reinforce
the effectiveness of a CPA firm’s independence policies, and thereby
strengthen public confidence in the relationship. In addition to providing
the board or audit committee with an annual analysis of the services pro
vided to that client during the year, as required under IV, 3(j), each CPA
firm should periodically discuss with its client’s board or audit committee
the scope of services it offers, describing how it applies the SEC Practice
Section criteria to its practice.
(3) Management’s Role

A CPA firm should not render services to its clients where those services
take the place of management decision making.
a. The CPA firm must assure that the proper relationship is maintained
in all engagements with SEC audit clients. Each engagement must be
carefully structured so that management is adequately involved in the
project and makes managerial decisions that may be required along the
way.
b. A CPA firm should not undertake an engagement unless it believes
that management has sufficient understanding of the work to be done
in order to properly carry out its management role and make informed
decisions.
c. A CPA firm should not undertake an engagement which, because of the
CPA firm’s continuous involvement, becomes an engagement to per
form a management or operating function. This interpretation would
preclude, for example, an engagement to manage a computer facility
over a period of time. More generally, this interpretation requires that
advisory engagements include provisions for management implementa
tion and operation on an ongoing basis.
(4) Contingent Fees

A CPA firm should not undertake an engagement where its fees are con
tingent on the outcome of the project. This interpretation would, for ex
ample, preclude performing merger and acquisition studies on a contingent
fee basis. Similarly, a firm should not undertake an engagement promising
a specific profit improvement. This interpretation draws on Rule 302, of
the AICPA Code of Ethics, and related Rulings 8 through 13.
Application of Criteria to Selected Services
The two criteria of “independence” and “related skills” are applied in this
section of the appendix to the following areas of services;
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Executive Recruiting
Marketing Consulting
Plant Layout and Design
Product Design and Analysis
Insurance Actuarial
Employee Benefit Consulting

As the need arises the Executive Committee of the AICPA SEC Practice
Section will apply the criteria to additional services and publish the results
to all members of the SEC Practice Section.
Executive Recruiting Services
The hiring of persons for managerial, executive, or director positions is a
function which is properly the client’s responsibility. Accordingly, the role
of the CPA firm in this function should be limited. The CPA firm should
not—
(1) Accept an engagement to search for, or seek out, prospective candi
dates for managerial, executive, or director positions with its audit
clients. This would not preclude giving an audit client the name of a
prospective candidate previously known to someone in the CPA firm.
(2) Engage in psychological testing, other formal testing or evaluation
programs, or undertake reference checks of prospective candidates for
an executive or director position on behalf of an audit client.
(3) Act as a negotiator on the audit client’s behalf, for example, in deter
mining position status or title, compensation, fringe benefits or other
conditions of employment.
(4) Recommend, or advise an audit client to hire, a specific candidate for
a specific job. However, a CPA firm may, upon request by the audit
client, interview candidates and advise the client on the candidate’s
competence for financial, accounting, administrative or control posi
tions.
When an audit client seeks to fill a position within its organization which
is related to its system of accounting, financial or administrative controls,
the client will frequently approach employees of the CPA firm directly as
candidates or seek referral of the CPA firm’s employees who may be con
sidering employment outside of the profession. Such employment from
time to time is an inevitable consequence of the training and experience
which the public accounting profession provides to its staff, is beneficial to
all concerned, including society in general, and therefore is not proscribed.
Marketing Consulting Services
The CPA firm should not render advisory services related to the marketing
function which require skills that are not related to accounting or auditing.
These precluded services include such activities as—
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(1) Purely subjective evaluations of any type, including the development
or evaluation of consumer attitude surveys.
(2) Development or conduct of market test activities.
(3) Development or evaluation of advertising copy, media strategy and
time/space buying plans.
(4) Development or evaluation of sales literature, aids presentations, con
tracts, etc., to be utilized in the selling situation.
Certain advisory services relating to the marketing function, however,
are oriented significantly toward accounting, financial, control or adminis
trative function. Such services are appropriate because they require skills
related to accounting or auditing. Engagements of this type are not pro
scribed and fall into two broad classes:
(1) Those where marketing is but one segment of a broader study such
as—
a. Operations or management audits.
b. Profitability studies of a business unit.
c. Reviews of forecasts and the conduct of financial feasibility studies.
d. Studies to strengthen business management systems.
(2) Those where only marketing activities are under review such as—
a. Studies of the effectiveness of financial and administrative controls
applied to marketing activities.
b. Analysis of quantitative market factors which affect demand for a
new or existing product.
c. Studies to improve the client’s market information systems.
Plant Layout and Design Services
In the broadest sense, plant layout includes the total design of a plant
facility. The CPA firm should not render such services which require skills
that are not accounting or auditing related. More specifically, services pre
cluded include such activities as—
1. Evaluating the geological and engineering characteristics involved in
site selection.
2. Architectural and engineering designing of production facilities and
processes, or equipment to be utilized in such facilities and processes.
3. Assuming the general contractor role related to the building, installa
tion or modification of facilities, processes or equipment.
4. Performance testing or other services related to the acceptance of facil
ities, processes and equipment.
Some services which are related to plant layout and design may properly
fall within the scope of a CPA firm’s services because they require account
ing or auditing related skills. Examples of such services are those where
the CPA firm assists its audit client to—
1. Improve the control and efficiency of operations.
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2. Determine the financial feasibility of new, expanded, or modified pro

duction facilities or processes.
3. Enhance the control and positioning of raw material, in process and
finished goods inventory.
4. Determine the clerical layout and staffing levels.
Product Design and Analysis
Services related to product design and analysis which involve the analysis,
research, design, modification, production and testing of physical prop
erties or results should not be rendered by CPA firms because they require
skills that are not accounting or auditing related. More specifically, CPA
firms should not undertake engagements involving—
(1) Product design, engineering and development of physical specifications.
(2) Development of technical policy or specifications of quality control
programs.
(3) Development or evaluation of product safety policy, standards, etc.
(4) Technical evaluation of physical or usage characteristics of competing
products.
(5) Package design and engineering.
There are, however, certain aspects of product design and analysis which
involve the analysis and estimation of the cost and profit aspects of product
design and production, or the financial and administrative controls re
quired to manage the product design and production activities. Because
such advisory services require skills which are accounting or auditing re
lated, they are a proper part of the CPA firm’s overall scope of services.
Insurance Actuarial Services
Actuarial skills are both accounting and auditing related. The bodies of
knowledge supporting the actuarial and accounting professions have a sub
stantial degree of overlap. Both professions involve the analysis of various
factors of time, probability and economics, and the quantification of such
analysis in financial terms. The results of their work are significantly inter
related. Their professions are logical extensions of each other; indeed, they
have practiced jointly for many years and even shared the same profes
sional society in Scotland prior to their becoming established in the United
States.
The work of actuarial specialists generally is necessary to obtain audit
satisfaction in support of insurance policy and loss reserves. To assist them
in meeting their audit responsibilities, a number of CPA firms have hired
qualified actuaries of their own.
The actuarial function is basic to the operation and management of an
insurance company. Management’s responsibility for this function cannot
be assumed by the CPA firm without jeopardizing its independence. Be
cause of the special significance of a CPA firm’s appearance of indepen
dence when auditing publicly held insurance companies:
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(1) The CPA firm should not render actuarially oriented advisory services
involving the determination of policy reserves and related accounts to
its audit clients unless such clients utilize their own actuaries or third
party actuaries to provide management with the primary actuarial
capabilities. This does not preclude the use of the CPA firm’s actuarial
staff in connection with the auditing of such reserves.
(2) Whenever the CPA firm renders actuarially oriented advisory services,
it must satisfy itself that it is acting in an advisory capacity and that
the responsibility for any significant actuarial methods and assump
tions is accepted by the client.
(3) The CPA firm should not render actuarially oriented advisory services
when the CPA firm’s involvement is continuous since such a relation
ship might be perceived as an engagement to perform a management
function.
Subject to the above limitations it is appropriate for the CPA firm to
render certain actuarially oriented advisory services to its audit clients.
Such services include—
(1) Assisting management to develop appropriate methods, assumptions,
and amounts for policy and loss reserves and other actuarial items
presented in financial reports based on the company’s historical ex
perience, current practices and future plans.
(2) Assisting management in the conversion of financial statements from
a statutory basis to one conforming with generally accepted account
ing principles.
(3) Analyzing actuarial considerations and alternatives in federal income
tax planning.
(4) Assisting management in the financial analyses of various matters such
as proposed new policies, new markets, business acquisitions and rein
surance needs.
Employee Benefit Consulting Services
Many types of benefit plans or programs are available to employees, in
cluding pension or retirement plans, profit-sharing and thrift plans, em
ployee stock ownership and other stock related plans, and death, disability,
and medical plans. Because of the complexity of tax regulations, alternate
accounting and funding principles, and the long range economic impact
involved in establishing and maintaining such plans, clients frequently seek
technical advice and assistance from their CPA firms. Advisory services
pertaining to employee benefit plans are related broadly to three basic
areas: plan design, periodic financial analysis of plan obligations and cost
(actuarial valuations), and plan administration.
As a part of the economic or financial evaluation of some types of plans,
principally pension and retirement plans, it is necessary to utilize various
mathematical formulae relating to time value of money and statistical prob
ability. Most such calculations today are made by use of general-purpose
computer programs, with subroutines specifically selected to suit the partic71

ular facts and circumstances. Although most accountants have some train
ing in and understanding of such skills, including the use of computers,
CPA firms which render such services frequently employ individuals spe
cifically trained and qualified as actuaries. Certain compliance and valua
tion reports required by ERISA, for example, must be signed by client per
sonnel or independent consultants who have been qualified by the govern
ment as enrolled actuaries.
Since the scope and nature of employee benefit advisory services, includ
ing actuarial services, require skills and disciplines related to accounting
and auditing, such services properly fit within the general scope of services
for a CPA firm. Indeed the concurrent provision of employee benefit and
accounting services by CPA firms has existed for many years. In rendering
such services, however, the CPA firm must be satisfied that such involve
ment will not compromise its professional independence or objectivity as
an auditor. Accordingly, the role of the CPA firm in rendering such serv
ices should be limited as follows:
(1) The CPA firm should limit its role to that of technical assistance and
advice, and not assume the client’s managerial functions or the client’s
responsibility for any significant judgments or assumptions implicit in
plan design, in plan administration, or in the related actuarial com
putations.
(2) Although various services may be updated or rendered on a recurring
or periodic basis, the CPA firm should not render employee benefit
consulting services which require the firm’s continuous involvement
and therefore become an engagement to perform a management func
tion.
(3) The CPA firm must satisfy itself that the client has sufficient under
standing of the implications of the technical factors involved in a
benefit plan and the alternatives considered in a benefit plan study, so
that the client can make its decisions based on an informed business
judgment and assume responsibility for its actions.
(4) The CPA firm should not render employee benefit consulting services
which involve—
a. maintaining original records of employee or plan investment data,
b. retaining custody of securities or other benefit plan assets,
c. acting as investment advisor or making investment decisions,
d. deciding claim administration or benefit eligibility,
e. negotiating plan provisions with employee representatives or other
wise representing employers in bargaining sessions,
f. assuming a fiduciary role as defined under ERISA or other appli
cable statutes or regulations, and
g. accepting commissions or other contingent fees.
Subject to the above limitations, the CPA firm may properly render
various employee benefit advisory services to its audit clients such as the
following:
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(1) P lan D esign

a. Help management develop estimates of cost, and possible tax and
accounting consequences of alternative benefit formulae.
b. Help management analyze the advantages and disadvantages of
alternatives for eligibility and vesting requirements, the methods of
distributing benefits, various funding policies and vehicles, and
other pertinent plan features.
c, Assist the client’s legal counsel in drafting the plan.
d. Assist management in connection with filing the plan with the In
ternal Revenue Service for the purpose of obtaining a determina
tion as to the plan’s “qualification” under the applicable provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA.
e. Assist the sponsor with filing and other requirements of regulatory
agencies, such as the Department of Labor and the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation.
(2) Periodic Financial Analysis of Plan Obligations and Cost (Actuarial
Valuations)
a. Assist management in the periodic estimation of benefit obligations
of ongoing pension plans and the determination of costs for mini
mum funding requirements and allowable income tax deductions.
b. Help management analyze and estimate the impact of proposed
changes in benefit plans or funding policies.
(3) Plan Administration
a. Assist management in the preparation or review of administrative
manuals and procedures governing the plan’s operation.
b. Assist management in the preparation of filings required by the
regulatory agencies.
c. Assist management in the preparation or review of communica
tion materials describing the benefit programs available to em
ployees.
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